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Canada has long been a climate change policy laggard. Canada is among
the world’s poorest-performing countries in terms of climate action—not only is
Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions-reduction target under the Paris Agreement
insufmciently ambitious, Canada is not even remotely on track to meet it.
Canada’s enduring inaction on climate change is legitimized and sustained by its
mainstream corporate news media, which contribute to the oil and gas industry’s
capture of Canadian climate and energy policy. In this article, I examine how
Canada’s leading national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, editorially framed the
completion of the controversial expansion of the Trans Mountain oil pipeline as
being in the “public interest.” The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the Trans
Mountain pipeline (among others) is a case study of how corporate new media
promote the production and export of fossil fuels at the expense of effective,
science-based climate law and policy.

Le Canada est depuis longtemps à la traîne en matière de politique sur les
changements climatiques. Il est l’un des pays les moins performants au monde
en matière d’action climatique—non seulement l’objectif de réduction des
émissions de gaz à effet de serre du Canada en vertu de l’Accord de Paris
n’est pas sufmsamment ambitieux, mais il n’est même pas en voie d’être atteint.
L’inaction persistante du Canada en matière de changements climatiques est
légitimée et soutenue par ses principaux médias d’information, qui contribuent à
ce que l’industrie pétrolière et gazière prenne en otage la politique canadienne
en matière de climat et d’énergie. Dans cet article, j’examine comment le
principal journal national du Canada, The Globe and Mail, a dit que l’achèvement
de l’expansion controversée du pipeline Trans Mountain était « dans l’intérêt
public ». La couverture éditoriale du quotidien The Globe and Mail sur le pipeline
Trans Mountain (entre autres) constitue une étude de cas sur la façon dont
les nouveaux médias d’entreprise favorisent la production et l’exportation de
combustibles fossiles au détriment d’une législation et de politiques climatiques
efmcaces et fondées sur la science.

* Assistant Professor, College of Law, and Associate Member, School of Environment and
Sustainability, University of Saskatchewan, j.maclean@usask.ca. For their helpful comments on
an earlier version of this article the author wishes to thank Sari Graben, Sara Seck, and the other
participants of the Purdy Crawford Emerging Business Law Scholars Workshop held at the Dalhousie
University Schulich School of Law on October 19-20, 2018, as well as the anonymous peer reviewers.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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As the crisis escalates…
… in our natural world, we refuse to turn away from the climate catastrophe and
species extinction. For The Guardian, reporting on the environment is a priority.
We give reporting on climate, nature and pollution the prominence it deserves,
stories which often go unreported by others in the media. At this pivotal time for
our species and our planet, we are determined to inform readers about threats,
consequences and solutions based on scienti¿c facts, not political prejudice or
business interests.
[…]
Our editorial independence means we set our own agenda and voice our own
opinions. Guardian journalism is free from commercial and political bias and
not inÀuenced by billionaire owners and shareholders. This means we can give
a voice to those less heard, explore where others turn away, and rigorously challenge those in power.1
May 21: Pipeline smarts debated. Plus other letters to the editor
Your editorialists tell us that “Ideologies aside, expanding the Trans Mountain
Pipeline is a no brainer” (Pipelines and Political Risk, May 17). That statement
1.
This message appears at the conclusion of each of The Guardian’s online articles concerning
the environment. See e.g. Editorial, “The Guardian view on climate crisis: what can we do?,” The
Guardian (11 August 2019), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/11/theguardian-view-on-climate-crisis-what-can-we-do> [https://perma.cc/UX32-U76Y].
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has only two interpretations. Either the millions of Canadians who oppose it are
without a brain or The Globe and Mail’s editorial board is. It’s clearly neither.
The Globe is being ideological and hypocritical. By supporting the Trans
Mountain expansion, The Globe is supporting promoting the business interests
of a foreign corporation and its investors, the spending of Canadian taxpayers’
dollars to insure them, pushing action counter to meeting national CO2
emission commitments, putting B.C.’s and the ocean environment at risk,
ignoring Indigenous rights, promoting dubious “national interest” as fact, and
looking to the end of its nose rather than the future of our grandchildren in a
hotter world.
Rob Garrard, Victoria2

Introduction
Regulatory capture is arguably the most important—and least studied
—dimension of both business regulation and regulation writ large.
Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, either in
law or application, is systematically directed away from the public interest
towards the special, private interests of regulated industries, largely but
not exclusively by the intent and actions of industries themselves.3 There
is scarcely an area of economic regulation untouched by industry capture.
According to the economist George Stigler, whose foundational work on
regulatory capture earned a Nobel prize in economics, until the centrality
of capture to the “basic logic of political life” is understood, “reformers
will be ill-equipped to use the state for their reforms and victims of the
state’s support for special groups will be helpless to protect themselves.”4

2.
Rob Garrard, “Letter to the editor,” The Globe and Mail (21 May 2018), online: <https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/opinion/letters/article-may-21-pipeline-smarts-debated-plus-other-letters-tothe-editor/> [https://perma.cc/2WL4-9MJT].
3.
Daniel Carpenter & David A Moss, “Introduction” in Daniel Carpenter & David A Moss, eds,
Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest InÀuence and How to Limit It (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 13. See also Brink Lindsey & Steven M Teles, The Captured
Economy: How the Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase Inequality
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017). For an application of regulatory capture in the
Canadian context, see Jason MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental
Law: Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 111 [MacLean, “The
Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law”]; Jason MacLean, “Regulatory Capture and the Role
of Academics in Public Policymaking: Lessons from Canada’s Environmental Regulatory Review
Process” (2019) 52:2 UBC L Rev 479 [MacLean, “Regulatory Capture and the Role of Academics”].
4.
George J Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2:1 The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 3 at 18 [Stigler, “Economic Regulation”]; see also George J
Stigler, “Supplementary Note on Economic Theories of Regulation” in George J. Stigler, The Citizen
and the State: Essays on Regulation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975) at 140. For an
assessment of Stigler’s contribution to the theory of regulation, see Sam Peltzman, “George Stigler’s
Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation” (1993) 101:5 Journal of Political Economy 818;
Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, “George J. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’”
in Steven J Balla, Martin Lodge & Edward C Page, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public
Policy and Administration (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015) at ch 20.

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

Such victims range from start-ups5 to established ¿rms,6 and from
consumers concerned about high prices and unfair policies7 to citizens
concerned about climate change.8
Regulatory capture is often dif¿cult to detect directly. This dif¿culty
stems in large part from the sometimes vague and shifting meaning of
the salient “public interest”—or, alternately, the “national interest”—in
respect of any given regulatory issue. Even the economic approach of
quantitatively weighing the bene¿ts accrued by industry against the costs
borne by the public in respect of a given piece of regulation begs the
questions of who the relevant public constituency is and how its interests
are to be de¿ned and prioritized.9 The public interest includes not only
costs but also beliefs and values; it has an irreducible normative dimension
that is contingent not only on context, but also competing discursive
constructions.
The normative dimension of the public interest in respect of any
given area of regulation remains equally complex and dif¿cult to establish
even in statutory regimes where regulators are subject to a legal “public
interest” standard. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed, the
“public interest is a broad concept and what it requires will depend on the
particular context.”10
5. See e.g. Bradley Tusk, The Fixer: My Adventures Saving Startups from Death by Politics (New
York, NY: Portfolio, 2018); Evan Bur¿eld & JD Harrison, Regulatory Hacking: A Playbook for
Startups (New York, NY: Portfolio, 2018). For a review of these books in relation to the concept of
regulatory capture, see Jonathan A Knee, “Review: Why Start-Ups Need a Regulatory Strategy to
Succeed,” The New York Times (11 September 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/
business/dealbook/¿xer-regulatory-hacking-review.html> [https://perma.cc/P7U3-TAX3].
6.
Veronique de Rugy, “How Special Interests Hide the True Costs of Tariffs,” The New York Times
(29 August 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/opinion/tariffs-trump-trade-specialinterests.html> [https://perma.cc/FNQ5-XWCH] [de Rugy, “True Costs of Tariffs”].
7.
Ibid. See also Daniel Schwarcz, “Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment
Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation” in Carpenter & Moss, supra note 3 at 365.
8.
See e.g. Auden Schendler & Andrew P Jones, “Stopping Climate Change Is Hopeless. Let’s Do
It,” The New York Times (6 October 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/opinion/
sunday/climate-change-global-warming.html> [https://perma.cc/73EE-SDYF] [Schendler & Jones,
“Stopping Climate Change”]; see also Bill McKibben, “Free California of Fossil Fuels,” The New
York Times (8 August 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/opinion/¿res-californiafossil-fuels.html> [https://perma.cc/36CW-QMT4].
9.
Stigler, “Economic Regulation,” supra note 4 at 10. For an argument that public interest
regulation can be based entirely on quantitative cost-bene¿t analysis of objective facts (as opposed to
normative values), see Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Bene¿t Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2018).
10. Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 at para 34; see
also the discussion of the wide margin of appreciation that the Federal Court of Appeal afforded to
the National Energy Board’s interpretation of “any public interest” under its controlling statute in
relation to oil sands pipelines and climate change in Forest Ethics Advocacy Association, and Donna
Sinclair v The National Energy Board, The Attorney General of Canada and Enbridge Pipelines Inc.,
2014 FCA 245 at para 69 (CanLII). For a discussion of how the composition of regulatory bodies
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For these reasons, the mainstream news media are attracting increasing
scrutiny both as a means and as strategic sites in and of themselves of
regulatory reform in the public interest. The media play a signi¿cant
role in manufacturing public opinion, including public opinion about
what constitutes the “public interest,”11 the starting point of regulatory
analysis, including regulatory reform. A growing number of studies
and commentaries, for example, are paying attention to how—and how
often—the news media are covering climate change science and policy
for precisely this purpose12: climate policy reform requires a suf¿cientlyinformed public motivated to press elected representatives and public
decisionmakers to act in the public interest.
Growing attention is also being paid to the ways in which powerful
industry interests inÀuence the media to shape public discourse and
attitudes about climate change and climate change policy options. There
is an intersection between the public interest in meaningful and effective
climate change action and the mainstream news media as a mechanism
of regulatory capture employed by entrenched special interests. Two
US climate change commentators have described this intersection in the
following terms:
To save civilization, most of us would need to supplement our standard
daily practices—eating, caring for family and community, faith—with
a steady push on the big forces that are restraining progress, the most
affects their determinations of the “public interest” in respect of statutory environmental assessments
of projects such as the Trans Mountain pipeline, see Meinhard Doelle & A John Sinclair, “The new
IAA in Canada: From revolutionary thoughts to reality” (2019) 79 Environmental Impact Assessment
Review 1, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2019.106292> [ https://perma.cc/8JEF-FP2T].
11. See e.g. Catherine Happer & Greg Philo, “The Role of the Media in the Construction of
Public Belief and Social Change” (2013) 1:1 Journal of Social and Political Psychology 321; Lesley
Henderson & Shona Hilton, “The media and public health: where next for critical analysis?” (2018)
28:4 Critical Public Health 373; Maxwell T Boykoff, “We Speak for the Trees: Media Reporting on
the Environment” (2009) 34 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 431.
12. See e.g. Anthony Leiserowitz et al, Climate Change in the American Mind: March 2018
(New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2017), online: <http://
climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/climate-change-american-mind-march-2018/> [https://
perma.cc/SSK5-L7UH]; Ted MacDonald, “National TV news is still failing to properly incorporate
climate change into hurricane coverage” (24 September 2018), Media Matters for America (blog),
online:
<https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2018/09/24/National-TV-news-is-still-failing-toproperly-incorporate-climate-change-into-hurricane-co/221423>
[perma.cc/V8FB-9PNL];
Joe
Romm, “TV networks are misinforming the public on climate change” (25 September 2018), Think
Progress (blog), online: <https://thinkprogress.org/tv-media-hurricane-Àorence-misinforming-publicon-climate-change-889551935ce1/> [perma.cc/9ATG-M44P]; John Gibbons, “Climate change
reporting should be obligatory,” The Irish Times (26 April 2019), online: <https://www.irishtimes.com/
opinion/climate-change-reporting-should-be-obligatory-1.3871618> [perma.cc/6ZRW-HSZG]; Mark
Hertsgaard & Kyle Pope, “The media are complacent while the world burns,” Columbia Journalism
Review (22 April 2019), online: <https://www.cjr.org/special_report/climate-change-media.php>
[perma.cc/4EL8-M8TX].
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SURPLQHQW EHLQJ WKH IRVVLO IXHO LQGXVWU\¶V FRRSWLRQ RI JRYHUQPHQW
HGXFDWLRQVFLHQFHDQGPHGLD13

To understand what such a “steady push” should consist of, it is
necessary not only to identify media co-optation and distortion generally
but also to shine a light on speci¿c instances of such distortion with a
view to exposing how they contribute to reshaping—and redirecting—the
public interest.
There has, for example, recently been a proliferation of educational
initiatives designed to improve individuals’ evaluation of the quality of
information presented by the news media and other information platforms.14
While such longer-term initiatives are laudable, it is also important to better
understand how the media inÀuence the construction and perception of the
public interest in respect of regulatory issues that are pressing and urgent
in the short-term, especially climate change mitigation, given the nature
and degree of the threat posed by climate change. Moreover, because even
well-educated individuals are susceptible to media bias and tend to default
to pre-committed political ideologies, improved media literacy in itself
is not a panacea.15 Research on the nature of how the media distort the
public interest and that informs how best to respond to and counter such
distortions is urgently required.
With these broad and challenging considerations in mind, I critically
examine how Canada’s leading newspaper, 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO, has
constructed the “public interest” in respect of the controversial Trans
Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. My central argument is that
7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO¶s coverage of the Trans Mountain pipeline serves
to legitimize and sustain climate change policy LQDFWLRQ in Canada, to
the short-term bene¿t of Canada’s oil and gas sector, and at the expense
of the public and the environment. The article unfolds as follows: In the
¿rst section I brieÀy discuss the political economy of the mainstream
news media in democratic societies, and describe the media “propaganda
model” as a useful analytical lens to read 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO¶s coverage
of the Trans Mountain project, speci¿cally its editorial characterization of
the “national interest” in approving and completing the project as soon as
13. Schendler & Jones, “Stopping Climate Change,” VXSUDnote 8 [emphasis added].
14. David MJ Lazer HW DO, “The science of fake news: Addressing fake news requires a
multidisciplinary effort” (2018) 359:6380 Science 1094 at 1095 [Lazer HWDO, “Science of fake news”].
15. The Information Society Project & The Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression,
“Fighting Fake News: Workshop Report” (New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, 2017) at 11,
online: <https://law.yale.edu/isp/initiatives/Àoyd-abrams-institute-freedom-expression/practitionerscholar-conferences-¿rst-amendment-topics/¿ghting-fake-news-workshop>
[perma.cc/5TKHLNGW] [Information Society Project, “Fighting Fake News”].

Manufacturing Consent to Climate Inaction: A Case Study
of the *OREHDQG0DLOࣰ’s Pipeline Coverage

289

possible. I proceed in the second section by brieÀy introducing The Globe
and Mail as Canada’s newspaper of record along with the history thus
far of the Trans Mountain project, and then provide a critical account of
The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the project vis-à-vis Canada’s
interests and obligations in respect of mitigating climate change. In the
third section of the article I discuss the dif¿culties inherent in seeking to
reform the news media as a means of countering this form of regulatory
capture. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the analysis and
suggesting avenues of future research.
I.

Democracy dies in darkness: The political economy of the fourth
estate
“Democracy dies in darkness” is the motto of the Washington Post
newspaper.16 The motto signals the foundational public-interest role that
a free and independent press plays in democratic societies by shining a
light on the special interests and workings of power. As Edmund Burke
reportedly remarked, “there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the
Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far
than them all.”17 And yet, the press and mass communications media more
generally have always been bound up in the exercise of political-economic
power, so much so that neither can be understood in isolation from the
other.18 There is an apparent and abiding tension between the news media
as watchdog and the news media as lapdog.19
Arguably the most powerful explanatory model of the media’s role
in shaping democratic discussion and debate about public policy is the
“propaganda model” developed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky.20
Propaganda is a provocative term, but in its more nuanced formulation it
has considerable explanatory power. Herman and Chomsky argue that the
mainstream news media in democratic societies do not play an overtly
16. Paul Farhi, “The Washington Post’s new slogan turns out to be an old saying,” Washington Post
(24 February 2017), online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-washington-postsnew-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199cda-fa02-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_
story.html?utm_term=.6f948243a7a7> [perma.cc/D3YS-Q4G7].
17. Quoted in C Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 5.
18. Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York:
Basic Books, 2004) at 1. See also Helen Holmes & David Taras, eds, Seeing Ourselves: Media Power
and Policy in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto, ON: Harcourt Brace & Company, Canada, 1996).
19. See e.g. Lawrence Lessig, America, Compromised (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2018), especially ch 3 (“The Media”); Pierre Bourdieu, On Television (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998). For an analysis in the Canadian context, see e.g. Kelly Blidook, “Choice and Content: Media
Ownership and Democratic Ideals in Canada” (2009) 3:2 The Canadian Political Science Review 52.
20. Edward S Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
News Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
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oppressive function as they do in totalitarian states. The news media
in democratic societies “permit—indeed, encourage—spirited debate,
criticism, and dissent as long as these remain faithfully within the system
of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a
system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”21
In contrast to the popular perception that propaganda is exclusively
state-based and operates principally through the use of intimidation
and fear-mongering, the news media in democratic societies tend not
to explicitly proclaim a particular party line (i.e. the narrow spectrum
of debate acceptable to the political-economic elite), but rather they
presuppose it, “thus helping to establish it even more deeply as the very
precondition of discussion, while also providing the appearance of lively
debate.”22
In the United States, for example, the Federal Communications
Commission maintained an of¿cial policy from 1949 to 1987 requiring
broadcast news providers to present controversial public interest topics in
a “balanced” manner.23 Known as the “Fairness Doctrine,” this policy had
the effect of ensuring that roughly equal time was accorded to each side
of controversial subjects, independent of merit.24 The “Fairness Doctrine”
has subsequently come to be understood by media and policy scholars as
a vehicle of propaganda, one that has been effectively deployed by the
tobacco industry and the fossil fuels industry.25
The following factors account for the news media’s distortional
propaganda role in otherwise democratic societies: (a) concentrated
corporate ownership of the news media; (b) advertising as the primary
revenue source for media outlets; (c) political-economic elite perspectives
as the predominant sources of news; (d) “Àak,” or government
efforts to suppress views critical of political-economic elites; and (e)
“anticommunism” via the promotion of capitalism as an economic system,

21. Ibid at 302.
22. Ibid at 17. This understanding of propaganda owes a considerable debt to the work of political
theorist Antonio Gramsci, particularly Gramsci’s conception of hegemony. For a discussion of the
relevance of Gramsci’s theory to the politics of climate change, see Geoff Mann & Joel Wainwright,
Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future (New York: Verso, 2018) at 87-98.
23. Much has been written about the Fairness Doctrine. For a discussion connecting the doctrine to
mainstream media propaganda, see e.g. James Owen Weatherall, Cailin O’Connor & Justin P Bruner,
“How to Beat Science and InÀuence People: Policy Makers and Propaganda in Epistemic Networks”
(2019) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science [forthcoming] at 14-15.
24. Ibid.
25. See e.g. Naomi Oreskes & Erik M Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury Press,
2019); Naomi Oreskes & Erik M Conway, The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the
Future (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
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including the promotion of market-based governance and regulatory
measures.26
Given these prevailing conditions of media ownership, concentration,
and composition, perhaps it should not be surprising—let alone
controversial—that the mainstream news media “serve to mobilize support
for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” through
the strategic use of “choices, emphases, and omissions”.27 Subsequent
empirical work on US news media bias strongly supports the media
propaganda model.28
While Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is based on the
US news media, Canadian analyses have, mutatis mutandis, consistently
arrived at substantially similar ¿ndings. Mainstream news journalism in
Canada, according to one study focused on the relationship between the
media and the prevailing normative order, “is concerned primarily with
communications among elite, authorized knowers.”29 “We can begin to
understand how news media circulate and reinforce dominant values and
meanings,” another study explains, “by examining ownership of Canadian
media, their dependence on advertising revenue and its implications, and
some typical patterns of news presentation.”30 According to the Kent
Commission, Canada’s Royal Commission on Newspapers, “it was leftwing viewpoints that tended to be under-represented as commercialism
increased its hold.”31 And as Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson
26. Herman & Chomsky, supra note 20 at 4-31. Public Choice theory provides a largely if not entirely
complementary account of the relationship between the mainstream media and public policymakers.
On one such account, the media, “to maximize readership or viewing audiences and thus enhance
advertising revenues, will trivialize complex policy issues, sensationalize mishaps that may not reÀect
systemic policy failures, and turn over issues at a rapid rate with minimal investigative follow-up to
cater to readers’ and viewers’ limited attention spans (rational ignorance)”: Michael J Trebilcock &
Edward M Iacobucci, “Privatization and Accountability” (2003) 116 Harv L Rev 1422 at 1440.
27. Herman & Chomsky, supra note 20 at xi.
28. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Anthony R DiMaggio, “The Propaganda Model
and Manufacturing Consent: U.S. Public Compliance and Resistance” in James McGilvray, ed, The
Cambridge Companion to Chomsky, 2nd ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 291.
29. Richard V Ericson, Patricia Baranek & Janet BL Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News
Organization (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1987) at 351. See also James Winter,
Democracy’s Oxygen: How Corporations Control the News (Montreal, QB: Black Rose Books, 1997).
30. Robert Hackett, Richard Pinet & Myles Ruggles, “News for Whom? Hegemony and Monopoly
versus Democracy in Canadian Media” in Homes & Taras, supra note 18 at 259 [Hackett, Pinet &
Ruggles, “News for Whom?”]. See also See Jennifer Ellen Good, “The Framing of Climate Change
in Canadian, American, and International Newspapers: A Media Propaganda Model Analysis” (2008)
33:2 Canadian Journal of Communication 233; Shane Gunster & Robert Neubauer, “From Public
Relations to Mob Rule: Media Framing of Social License in Canada” (2018) 43:1 Canadian Journal of
Communication 11.
31. Canada, Royal Commission on Newspapers (Kent Commission) (Hull, QB: 1981) at 15, online:
<http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/kent1981-eng/kent1981-eng.htm>
[https://perma.cc/ZT5H-WJXX].
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observed in 1996, “more [news media] commentators than ever are
ideologues of the right.”32
Given the political and economic importance of the news media
generally, a growing number of researchers based in democratic societies
are investigating mainstream media representations of climate change,
the most pressing public interest issue of our time.33 Of course, climate
change is not a discrete public policy issue that can be meaningfully
discussed in isolation from other public policy concerns, including issues
of economic competitiveness, growth, and inequality. It follows that media
representations of a number of important business and economic issues
—e.g. domestic and foreign investment, international trade, job growth,
natural resources extraction, infrastructure, energy costs, commodity
prices, and many more—may have signi¿cant climate change implications,
even if those implications are not always framed as such. This may help
explain the curious ¿nding that scholarly research on &DQDGLDQ media
representations of climate change appears to be GHFOLQLQJ.34
While analyses of media representations of climate change are
interesting and important in and of themselves,35 such analyses do not
always directly connect the form and substance of those representations
to the critically important issue of climate policy action (or LQDFWLRQ,
as is more often the case) in political and economic context.36 This is
particularly problematic in light of recent integrated assessment modeling
suggesting that rapid and widespread changes in both individual behaviour
and socioeconomic systems are urgently required to limit global warming
to 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial norm.37
Utilizing Herman and Chomsky’s media propaganda model, I
analyze a contextually-important set of media representations in relation
to a particular climate policy outcome. In the next section, I provide an

32. Jeffrey Simpson, “Our industry is chasing its tale,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(18 April 1996) at A17.
33. Mike A Schäfer & Inga Schlichting, “Media Representations of Climate Change: A MetaAnalysis of the Research Field” (2014) 8:2 Environmental Communication 142.
34. ,ELG at 149. But see the recent special thematic issue of the Canadian Journal of Communication,
“Communicating Power: Energy, Canada, and the Field(s) of Communication” (2018) 43:1.
35. See e.g. Brigitte Nerlich, “Climate change through an editorial lens” (2018) 8:6 Nature Climate
Change 458 [Nerlich, “Climate change through an editorial lens”].
36. See e.g. Linda Steg, “Limiting climate change requires research on climate action” (2018) 8:9
Nature Climate Change 754.
37. See e.g. Arnulf Grubler HWDO, “A low energy demand scenario for meeting the 1.5 ºC target and
sustainable development goals without negative emissions technologies” (2018) 3:6 Nature Energy
517; Detlef P van Vuuren HWDO, “Alternative pathways to the 1.5 ºC target reduce the need for negative
emission technologies” (2018) 8:4 Nature Climate Change 391. See also the discussion of the UN
IPCC’s most recent summary report to policymakers regarding the urgent and unprecedented actions
required to meet the 1.5º C target in the concluding section of this article.
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DFFRXQWRI7KH*OREHDQG0DLO¶VHGLWRULDOFRYHUDJHRIWKHFRQWURYHUVLDO
7UDQV0RXQWDLQRLOSLSHOLQHH[SDQVLRQSURMHFW7KHDQDO\WLFDODLPRIWKLV
DFFRXQWLVWRFRQFHSWXDOL]HDQGH[SRVHPDLQVWUHDPPHGLDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
RI FOLPDWH FKDQJH SROLF\ DV D PHDQV RI IRVVLO IXHOV LQGXVWULHV¶ FDSWXUH
RI FOLPDWH FKDQJH SROLF\PDNLQJ ZLWK WKH UHJUHWWDEOH UHVXOW EHLQJ WKH
OHJLWLPL]DWLRQRIFOLPDWHSROLF\LQDFWLRQLQ&DQDGD
%HIRUH SURFHHGLQJ KRZHYHU D EULHI GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH DUWLFOH¶V
PHWKRGRORJ\LQFOXGLQJDQLPSRUWDQWPHWKRGRORJLFDOFDYHDWLVLQRUGHU
,Q WKLV DUWLFOH , IRFXV RQ HGLWRULDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV²QDUUDWLYH
³IUDPLQJV´²RIIRVVLOIXHOVLQIUDVWUXFWXUH VSHFL¿FDOO\WKH7UDQV0RXQWDLQ
RLO SLSHOLQH H[SDQVLRQ SURMHFW  DQG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS RI IRVVLO IXHOV
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHWRFOLPDWHFKDQJHSROLF\)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVVWXG\
,XVHG D WKHVHDUFKIXQFWLRQRQ7KH*OREHDQG0DLO¶VRQOLQHKRPHSDJH
E )DFWLYDDJOREDOQHZVGDWDEDVHDQGDVDFUXGHFDWFKDOO F WKHVHDUFK
HQJLQHRI*RRJOHWRLGHQWLI\WKHWRWDOVHWRIDUWLFOHVSXEOLVKHGE\7KH*OREH
DQG0DLOWKDWUHIHUWRWKH7UDQV0RXQWDLQSURMHFWIURPXQWLOWKHWLPH
RIZULWLQJ³LWHPV´SXEOLVKHGLQ7KH*OREHDQG0DLOUHIHUUHGWR7UDQV
0RXQWDLQ7KRVHLWHPVLQFOXGH*OREHHGLWRULDOV ZULWWHQE\WKHQHZVSDSHU¶V
HGLWRULDO ERDUG UHSUHVHQWLQJ WKH QHZVSDSHU¶V RI¿FLDO YLHZSRLQW  OHWWHUV
WRWKHHGLWRUFROXPQVZULWWHQE\*OREHVWDIIFROXPQLVWV ZKLFKYLUWXDOO\
DOZD\V DFFRUG ZLWK WKH QHZVSDSHU¶V RI¿FLDO HGLWRULDO YLHZSRLQWV  QHZV
UHSRUWV ZULWWHQ E\ *OREH VWDII UHSRUWHUV DQG UHSRUWHUV ZRUNLQJ IRU RWKHU
QHZV DJHQFLHV DQG LQGHSHQGHQWO\FRQWULEXWHG RSLQLRQHGLWRULDOV ³RS
HGV´ WKDWDUHDFFHSWHGIRUSXEOLFDWLRQE\WKH*OREH¶VHGLWRUVWKHDXWKRUV
RILQGHSHQGHQWO\FRQWULEXWHGRSHGVLQFOXGHDFDGHPLFVYDULRXVLQGXVWU\
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV SROLWLFDO FRPPHQWDWRUV PHPEHUV RI QRQJRYHUQPHQWDO
RUJDQL]DWLRQVIUHHODQFHMRXUQDOLVWVSROLWLFLDQVDQGRWKHUSURPLQHQWSXEOLF
¿JXUHVDQGRI¿FLDOVDQGVWLOORWKHUV7KHWRWDOQXPEHURILWHPVUHIHUULQJ
WR 7UDQV 0RXQWDLQ LV LQÀDWHG KRZHYHU EHFDXVH WKLV QXPEHU DOVR DQG
XQDYRLGDEO\ LQFOXGHV RQOLQH OLQNV HPEHGGHG ZLWKLQ LQGLYLGXDO LWHPV WR
RWKHULWHPVDOVRUHIHUULQJWR7UDQV0RXQWDLQ
,Q WKH FRXUVH RI FRQGXFWLQJ WKH DQDO\VLV GHVFULEHG EHORZ , UHDG DOO
WKHHGLWRULDOVLQGHSHQGHQWRSHGVVWDIIFROXPQVQHZVUHSRUWVDQGOHWWHUV
WRWKHHGLWRU\LHOGHGE\WKHVHDUFKHVGHVFULEHGDERYH LWHPVLQDOO 
7KH GLVFXVVLRQ EHORZ KRZHYHU IRFXVHV SULPDULO\ RQ 7KH *OREH DQG
0DLO¶VHGLWRULDOVZKLFKDVDVHWRIQRPLQDOO\LQGHSHQGHQWDQG³EDODQFHG´
QRUPDWLYH IUDPLQJV RI WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW KDV D QDUUDWLYH FRKHUHQFH DQG
GHSWKWKDWOHQGVLWVHOIWRDULFKHUPRUHVXJJHVWLYHDQDO\VLV

 1HUOLFK³&OLPDWHFKDQJHWKURXJKDQHGLWRULDOOHQV´VXSUDQRWHDW
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Moreover, I conducted the analysis of 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO¶s editorial
coverage of Trans Mountain in a qualitative manner so as to best represent
the inescapably value-laden narrative context and discursive nature of the
editorials themselves. This approach accords with both the predominant
approach to analyzing media representations in the ¿eld of Canadian
communication studies,39 as well as the model advocated in a leading sociolegal study of media concentration, content, and democratic politics.40
Rather than coding and counting these editorials through the top-down use
of DSULRUL categories, based on their availability as data rather than their
conceptual relevance,41 I have instead opted to read the entire corpus of
relevant editorials closely and in full, and to analyze them in an inductive,
textured manner sensitive to their political and public policy context. As I
will illustrate in considerable detail below, speci¿c narrative phraseologies
reÀect speci¿c normative framings. Such phraseologies recur throughout
7KH*OREHDQG0DLO’s editorial coverage of the Trans Mountain pipeline,
and this recurring feature is highly instructive from a media propaganda
and regulatory capture perspective. Finally, by quoting extensively from
the editorials and providing publicly-accessible links to them, readers can
judge for themselves whether or not, and to what extent, they trust my
interpretations.
That said, the following methodological caveat is crucially important:
I do not posit either a direct or invariable cause-and-effect relationship
between media representations and public policy outcomes. As Herman
and Chomsky caution, their propaganda model describes forces that
help to explain how the news media tend to operate, which is strongly
suggestive—but not independently determinative—of the kind of
legitimizing function the news media play. The media propaganda model
does not claim or imply that propaganda emanating from the news media
is always effective, directly or indirectly; as Herman and Chomsky are at
pains to emphasize, “the system is not all powerful.”42

39. See e.g. Alan O’Connor, “Fairness and Balance in CBC Radio News: Chronicle of a Complaint”
(2019) 44:1 Canadian Journal of Communication 133; Andrew Chater, “An Examination of the
Framing of Climate Change by the Government of Canada, 2006–2016” (2018) 43:4 Canadian Journal
of Communication 150; Yasmin Jiwani, “Barbarians in/of the Land: ReÀections of Muslim Youth in
the Canadian Press” (2016) 11:1 Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education 36.
40. Baker, VXSUD note 17 at 19-26. Baker offers “six cautions about the use of positivist social
science research” (at 20) in respect of the study of media effects on democratic politics, and argues—
convincingly, in my view—that “the impulse of many social scientists to be value-neutral is equivalent
to the ostrich sticking its head in the sand” (at 23).
41. This is Baker’s third caution against the use of positivist statistical evidence, namely, that the
availability of evidence should not determine the content of investigations: LELG at 23.
42. Herman & Chomsky, VXSUDnote 20 at xii, 306.
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II. The Globe and MailDQGWKH³SHRSOH¶VSLSHOLQH´
1. The Globe and Mail:&DQDGD¶VQHZVSDSHURIUHFRUG
7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO is widely regarded as Canada’s “newspaper of
record.”43 The *OREH is owned by the Thomson family, the wealthiest
family in Canada,44 through its private holding company and investment
arm, The Woodbridge Company Limited,45 which is also the principal
and controlling shareholder of Thomson Reuters Corporation, a publiclytraded media corporation listed on both the New York and Toronto Stock
Exchanges.46 Through its print and digital formats, the *OREH claims to
reach over six million readers per week.47 It is not an exaggeration to
claim, as does the *OREH, that the *OREH “is Canada’s foremost news media
company and a part of Canada’s fabric.”48
The *OREH views itself as “independent but not neutral.”49 The *OREH’s
motto, adopted upon its founding in 1844, is a quote from the pseudonymous
English political writer Junius: “The subject who is truly loyal to the Chief
Magistrate will neither advise nor submit to arbitrary measures.”50 This
motto continues to appear on the Globe’s editorial page as well as its
online home page, and not unlike the :DVKLQJWRQ3RVW’s motto it signals
the newspaper’s commitment to independent reporting and commentary.
43. See e.g. David Hayes, 3RZHU DQG ,QÀXHQFH 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO DQG WKH 1HZV 5HYROXWLRQ
(Toronto, ON: Key Porter Books, 1992); Wallace Clement, 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ &DQDGD %XLOGLQJ
RQ WKH 1HZ &DQDGLDQ 3ROLWLFDO (FRQRP\ (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996)
at 343; Nick Fillmore, “What’s behind the shake up at ‘Canada’s newspaper of record’?,” UDEEOH
FD (2 June 2009), online: <http://www.rabble.ca/news/2009/06/shake-globe> [perma.cc/6YAH42MY]; “Globe and Mail to cut jobs,” 7KH 6WUDLW 7LPHV (11 January 2009), online: <https://web.
archive.org/web/20090130083617/http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Money/Story/
STIStory_324744.html> [perma.cc/7HRN-FTE4]. Encyclopaedia Britannica’s online entry for 7KH
*OREH DQG 0DLO describes it as a “daily newspaper published in Toronto, the most prestigious and
inÀuential news journal in Canada,” online: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Globe-andMail> [perma.cc/824Y-3U4U] [Britannica, “The Globe and Mail”].
44. “Canada’s Richest People 2018: The Top 25 Richest Canadians,” &DQDGLDQ %XVLQHVV (9
November 2017), online: <https://www.canadianbusiness.com/lists-and-rankings/richest-people/top25-richest-canadians-2018/> [perma.cc/HP78-RWGW].
45. See Bloomberg.com, “Company Overview of The Woodbridge Company Limited,” %ORRPEHUJ
(27 September 2018), online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.
asp?privcapId=1173195> [perma.cc/9NB9-3KE3]; see also 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO“About Us,” online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/about/> [perma.cc/C8VE-4VCA] [*OREH, “About Us”].
46. Thomson Reuters, online: <https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en.html> [perma.cc/64GMAZUQ]. In the fourth quarter of 2018, Thomson Reuters reported revenue of US$1.52 billion, and
its share price reached US$73.24, a record high for the company: Matt Scuffham, “Thomson Reuters
shares hit record high on earnings beat,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(27 February 2019), B6.
47. *OREH“About Us,” VXSUDnote 45.
48. ,ELG.
49. Britannica, “The Globe and Mail,” VXSUDnote 43.
50. Wikipedia, “7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO” online: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Globe_and_
Mail> [perma.cc/7Q2Y-7CZA].
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In an editorial published on World Press Freedom Day, the *OREH made its
commitment to journalistic independence explicit, writing that the “health
of democratic institutions, and wider participatory democracy, is directly
linked to an independent press.”51 The *OREH’s Public Editor similarly
explained that the media’s role “is to question the authorities.”52 Indeed,
according to the *OREH’s own “Editorial Code of Conduct,” as a matter of
“journalistic principle,” the *OREH commits to “seek to provide reasonable
accounts of competing views in any controversy so as to enable readers to
make up their own minds.”53
The *OREH routinely celebrates its own journalistic competence
and integrity in service of the public interest.54 According to its online
homepage, the *OREH has won more national newspaper awards than any
other news organization in Canada, including multiple Michener Awards
for public-service journalism.55 Upon recently receiving two Jack Webster
awards (which recognize excellence in journalism in British Columbia) for
its reporting on the Trans Mountain pipeline, the *OREH¶s Editor-in-Chief
remarked that ³H[SODLQLQJ SROLFLHV WKDW ZLOO GHFLGH RXU HQYLURQPHQWDO
IXWXUH>LV@FHQWUDOWRRXUUROH´56
With these editorial principles and commitments in place, I turn to a
brief description of the controversial Trans Mountain pipeline expansion
project, followed by an account and analysis of the *OREH’s editorial
coverage—and SURPRWLRQ—of the project in light of its editorial and
journalistic commitments.
2. 7KH7UDQV0RXQWDLQSLSHOLQHH[SDQVLRQSURMHFW
The Trans Mountain pipeline system was originally constructed in 1953,
and since then has transported oil from Edmonton, Alberta to a coastal
marine terminal located in Burnaby, British Columbia.57 The pipeline was
51. “Globe editorial: Democracy’s immutable need for a free press,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (2
May 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorialdemocracys-immutable-need-for-a-free-press/> [perma.cc/G9KG-N949].
52. Sylvia Stead, “Without dutiful reporting, we abandon truth in news,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO
(25 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/public-editor/article-without-dutifulreporting-we-abandon-truth-in-news/> [perma.cc/TC43-8P34].
53. 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO“Editorial Code of Conduct,” online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
about/editorial-code/> [perma.cc/VY97-P252] [*OREH“Code of Conduct”].
54. See e.g. “Globe and Mail’s Unfounded investigation wins Michener Award,” 7KH *OREH DQG
0DLO (12 June 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-globe-and-mailwins-michener-award-for-series-on-police-handling-of-3/> [perma.cc/5FLA-BMXL].
55. *OREH“About Us,” VXSUDnote 45.
56. “The Globe and Mail wins B.C. awards for stories on Trans Mountain pipeline, opioids,” 7KH
*OREH DQG 0DLO (13 October 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/theglobe-and-mail-wins-bc-awards-for-stories-on-trans-mountain-pipeline-opioids/article36581042/>
[perma.cc/K6A3-U5L7] [emphasis added] [*OREH“Globe wins B.C. awards”].
57. “Explainer: Trans Mountain, Trudeau and the B.C.-Alberta feud: A guide to the political saga so
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originally owned by the Texas-based company Kinder Morgan; Kinder
Morgan’s shareholders approved the company’s sale of the pipeline for
$4.3 billion to the Government of Canada on 30 August 2018.58 Since
2012, Kinder Morgan had been seeking provincial and federal approval of
its proposed expansion of the project—a “twinning” of the pipeline in the
form of an additional (larger) pipeline to be constructed along the route of
the existing pipeline, a construction project initially valued at $7.4 billion.
Presently, Trans Mountain carries approximately 300,000 barrels of oil per
day.59 If the expansion of the pipeline is completed, Trans Mountain would
have the capacity to transport approximately 890,000 barrels per day, an
approximately threefold increase in the pipeline’s capacity.60
The National Energy Board (NEB) reviewed the Trans Mountain
expansion proposal, which Kinder Morgan submitted to the NEB on
16 December 2013.61 On 19 May 2016, the NEB issued a report to the
federal Governor in Council (Cabinet) recommending that the Trans
Mountain expansion project be approved subject to 157 technical
conditions.62 Following the release of the NEB’s report, the federal
Minister of Natural Resources named a three-member ministerial expert
panel to further review the project proposal. The objective of the expert
panel was to hear from Indigenous communities and other Canadians
along the proposed pipeline and shipping route to hear views that may not
have been considered as part of the initial NEB review.
The federal government’s additional consultation phase was designed
to consider the extent to which the NEB’s recommended conditions
for the project effectively responded to concerns raised by Indigenous
communities, and to identify any outstanding issues and potential
accommodation measures necessary to mitigate adverse impacts on
their rights.63 It is important to note, however, that neither the NEB’s
review nor the federal government’s supplemental review of the Trans
Mountain expansion meaningfully considered the project’s climate change
implications. The government’s supplemental review was not able “to

far”, 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(21 September 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-trans-mountain-kinder-morgan-pipeline-bc-alberta-explainer/>
[perma.cc/F2NW-SQ3F]
[*OREHDQG0DLO“Trans Mountain Explainer”].
58. ,ELG
59. ,ELG.
60. ,ELG.
61. National Energy Board, “Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC—Trans Mountain Expansion Project,”
online:
<https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pplctnÀng/mjrpp/trnsmntnxpnsn/index-eng.html>
[perma.
cc/32S6-M7LK].
62. ,ELG
63. ,ELG
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conclude de¿nitively on whether emissions will increase as a result of the
project.”64 Curiously, the government’s supplemental review nevertheless
concluded that the project will “not impact the emissions protections
that underpin the plan to meet or exceed Canada’s 2030 target of at least
[a] 30 per cent reduction below 2005 levels of emissions.”65 The federal
government has thus far refused to disclose the ¿nancial risks that climate
change poses to Trans Mountain’s long-term commercial prospects, even
as it encourages Canadian corporations to disclose their own climate
risks.66
At the conclusion of the government’s additional review, on
29 November 2016 the Governor in Council directed the NEB to issue a
Certi¿cate of Public Convenience and Necessity pursuant to the National
Energy Board Act for the Trans Mountain expansion project.67 On
30 January 2018, the BC provincial government announced its intention
to develop additional measures to improve its “preparedness, response
and recovery” relating to spills of heavy oil, including diluted bitumen,
the oil that would Àow through the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion.
The purpose of the new regulations, the BC government explained, was
to ensure immediate and geographically-speci¿c responses following a
spill of heavy crude oil, whether from a pipeline or from the rail or truck
transport of oil; maximize the application of regulations to marine spills so
as to complement existing federal measures; restrict the increase of diluted
bitumen and other heavy oil transportation until the behaviour and effects

64. Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, “Trans Mountain Expansion Project,”
online: <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/resources/19142> [perma.cc/2QJA-PWHL].
65. Ibid. For an initial analysis of this apparent contradiction, see Chris Tollefson & Jason MacLean,
“Here is why B.C. must do its own review of the Trans Mountain pipeline,” The Globe and Mail (23
May 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-bc-must-do-its-own-reviewof-the-trans-mountain-pipeline/article35095482/?utm_source=Shared+Article+Sent+to+User&u
tm_medium=E-mail:+Newsletters+/+E-Blasts+/+etc.&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links>
[perma.cc/4RV2-EEVC].
66. See Shawn McCarthy, “Ottawa won’t commit to disclosing carbon risk for expansion of Trans
Mountain pipeline,” The Globe and Mail (19 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/business/article-ottawa-non-committal-to-carbon-risk-disclosure-for-trans-mountain/> [perma.
cc/422F-277W] [McCarthy, “Ottawa won’t disclose carbon risk of Trans Mountain”]; Shawn
McCarthy, “Lack of climate clarity threatens oil reserve values, report says,” The Globe and Mail (17
January 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-oil-reservesat-risk-from-policies-to-combat-global-warming/> [perma.cc/5ZA3-VEKC]. McCarthy reports that,
“[t]o date, the government of Canada—which owns the Trans Mountain system—has not conducted
an analysis of how an international effort to avert the worst effects of global warming would affect the
pipeline’s long-term pro¿tability.”
67. Ibid. See also “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Pipeline Announcement” (29 November
2016), online: <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/11/29/prime-minister-justin-trudeaus-pipelineannouncement> [perma.cc/YXK8-65XV]. In the same announcement, the government directed the
NEB to reject the Northern Gateway proposal.
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of spilled heavy oil can be better understood and managed; and allow for
compensation for the loss of public and cultural use of land, resources and
public amenities resulting from heavy oil spills.68
The Trans Mountain project has also been subject to considerable
litigation, including litigation concerning jurisdiction and project
permitting and, most importantly, certain of the project’s adverse
environmental effects and the federal government’s constitutional duty to
consult and accommodate affected Indigenous groups. In Tsleil-Waututh
Nation v Canada (Attorney General),69 the Federal Court of Appeal
quashed the government’s Order in Council approving the pipeline, and
remitted the matter back to the federal Cabinet for a redetermination. This
included a referral of certain of the NEB’s recommendations and terms
and conditions back to the NEB for reconsideration.70
Speci¿cally, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the government’s
approval of the pipeline was unreasonable on account of two Àaws in the
review process. First, the NEB unreasonably determined that the pipeline’s
expansion was not likely to cause signi¿cant adverse environmental
effects. This ¿nding was central to the NEB’s report to the Governor
in Council, and arose from the NEB’s unjusti¿ed and unreasonable
failure to assess the effects of pipeline-related marine shipping under
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 because it had
unreasonably excluded marine shipping from the project’s de¿nition. The
Court concluded that having been furnished with such a Àawed report, the
Governor in Council could not legally make the kind of assessment of the

68. BC Gov News, “Environment and Climate Change Strategy: Additional measures being
developed to protect B.C.’s environment from spills” (30 January 2018), online: <https://news.gov.
bc.ca/releases/2018ENV0003-000115> [perma.cc/45AR-PK59]; for an initial analysis of British
Columbia’s proposed measures published by the Globe, see Jason MacLean, “The constitutional
complexity of pipelines: It’s as clear as bitumen,” The Globe and Mail (5 February 2018), online:
< https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-constitutional-complexity-of-pipelines-its-asclear-as-bitumen/article37849206/> [perma.cc/T4YR-GZ7N]. British Columbia submitted what
was considered to be the most controversial of its proposed measures—its authority to restrict
the increase of diluted bitumen transportation in British Columbia until the behaviour and effects
of spilled bitumen can be better understood and managed—as a reference to the Court of Appeal
for British Columbia for a ruling on the measure’s constitutionality. For further background on the
reference, including British Columbia’s proposed legislative measures, see BC Gov News, “Province
submits court reference to protect B.C.’s coast” (26 April 2018), online: <https://news.gov.bc.ca/
releases/2018PREM0019-000742> [perma.cc/H6HX-ZAF6]. The BC Court of Appeal unanimously
ruled that the province’s proposed regulations are constitutionally invalid: Reference re Environmental
Management Act (British Columbia), 2019 BCCA 181. British Columbia is appealing the decision to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
69. Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153 (CanLII) [Tsleil-Waututh].
70. Ibid at para 774.
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pipeline expansion’s environmental effects and the public interest that the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 required.71
Second, the Court concluded that the government failed to satisfy
its constitutional duty to consult and accommodate affected Indigenous
groups. The Court found that the government failed to “engage, dialogue
meaningfully and grapple with the concerns expressed to it in good faith
by the Indigenous applicants so as to explore possible accommodation
of these concerns.”72 In particular, the Court found that the government
failed to make a genuine and sustained effort “to pursue meaningful, twoway dialogue.”73 The government provided very few responses to affected
Indigenous groups’ questions, and when the government did respond, the
Court found that its responses were brief and generic. More problematic still,
the Court found that the government failed to give serious consideration to
whether any of the NEB’s ¿ndings were unreasonable or incorrect. Finally,
the government did not consider amending or supplementing the NEB’s
recommended conditions, which it had the authority to do.74
In response to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision quashing the
government’s approval of the Trans Mountain project, the government
directed the NEB to reconsider—in a 22-week timeframe—the effects of the
pipeline-related increase in marine tanker traf¿c on endangered Southern
resident killer whales.75 The government also set out a new consultation
process to address the de¿ciencies in its initial consultations with affected
Indigenous groups identi¿ed by the Federal Court of Appeal.76 The federal
government re-approved the Trans Mountain pipeline on 18 June 2019.77

71. Ibid at paras 765-766.
72. Ibid at para 754.
73. Ibid at para 756.
74. Ibid at para 757.
75. Shawn McCarthy & Justine Hunter, “Ottawa orders NEB to review marine-traf¿c impact from
Trans Mountain oil shipments,” The Globe and Mail (21 September 2018), online: <https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/article-ottawa-orders-neb-toreconsider-trans-mountain-expansion-project/> [perma.cc/8XN4-SR9G]. Upon the completion of its
reconsideration, the NEB once again recommended that the project be approved: National Energy
Board, “Reconsideration Report—Trans Mountain Expansion Project” (22 February 2019), online:
<http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pplctnÀng/mjrpp/trnsmntnxpnsn/trnsmntnxpnsnrprt-eng.html> [perma.
cc/L2G9-8D9L].
76. See Shawn McCarthy, “Ottawa appoints former judge to oversee consultations with First
Nations over Trans Mountain expansion,” The Globe and Mail (3 October 2018), online: <https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/article-ottawa-taps-exsupreme-court-justice-to-oversee-trans-mountain/> [perma.cc/M8U2-F35Y].
77. Government of Canada, Order in Council PC 2019-0820 (18 June 2019). Both environmental
and Indigenous groups immediately commenced legal challenges to the government’s re-approval.
Those challenges remain pending at this writing.
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3. 0DQXIDFWXULQJWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW7KHGlobe¶VSURPRWLRQRIWKH
³SHRSOH¶VSLSHOLQH´
Immediately following the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision quashing the
government’s initial approval of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion,
the *OREH published an editorial entitled “The problem isn’t the pipeline,
it’s the way it was approved.”78 With the proper response, the *OREH argued,
“Canada could end up with both a much-needed pipeline expansion and
a clearer set of rules for approving projects of this kind.”79 In a followup editorial, the *OREH added “there is every reason to be con¿dent the
SHRSOH¶V SLSHOLQH will get built after a few more hurdles are cleared.”80
“The national interest,” the *OREH declared, “is served by the project going
ahead as soon as possible.”81
The *OREH is not a recent convert to the cause of the Trans Mountain
pipeline expansion. Shortly after Kinder Morgan submitted its original
application to the NEB seeking the Board’s support for its proposed
expansion, there was a provincial election in British Columbia. Polls had
suggested that the incumbent Liberals had little chance of prevailing over
the favoured New Democratic Party (NDP), which had strongly opposed
the Trans Mountain expansion project. The Liberals won a surprising
majority government. In the *OREH’s view, the NDP underestimated BC
voters’ demands for increasing job creation and provincial revenues from
natural resources development.82 The *OREH urged the new BC Liberal
government to become “an open-minded partner with Alberta in its bid to
get its oil to tidewaters for export.”83 To do so, the *OREH added, the BC
premier (Christy Clark) must “keep her eye on jobs and growth while at

78. “Globe editorial: The problem isn’t the pipeline, it’s the way it was approved,” 7KH*OREHDQG
0DLO (30 August 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globeeditorial-the-problem-isnt-the-pipeline-its-the-way-it-was/> [perma.cc/DT39-VQXQ] [*OREH “The
problem isn’t the pipeline”].
79. ,ELG
80. “Globe editorial: Lashing out at Ottawa won’t save the people’s pipeline,” 7KH *OREH DQG
0DLO (31 August 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globeeditorial-lashing-out-at-ottawa-wont-save-the-peoples/> [perma.cc/G6YG-JDD6] [*OREH, “Lashing
out won’t save the people’s pipeline”].
81. “Globe editorial: The way forward for Trans Mountain,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(23 September
2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-the-wayforward-for-trans-mountain/> [*OREH“The way forward”] [perma.cc/2VHP-J5VQ].
82. “Globe Editorial: B.C. voters choose economic growth in historic general election,” 7KH*OREH
DQG 0DLO (15 May 2013), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/globeeditorial-bc-voters-choose-economic-growth-in-historic-general-election/article11935330/> [perma.
cc/EBT9-3TWQ].
83. ,ELG
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the same time ensuring that the environment is protected and that First
Nations’ voices are heard every step of the way.”84
While the *OREH’s unsolicited pipeline policy advice to the BC
government in 2013 might appear to be rooted in a concern for Alberta’s
oil, the *OREH has consistently adopted the view that expanding production
in Alberta’s oil sands is in the broader QDWLRQDO interest. In an editorial
weighing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Trans Mountain
pipeline expansion vis-à-vis Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline
proposal and TransCanada’s Keystone XL proposal, the *OREH observed
that the “long-running development of the Western Canadian oil patch
is predicated on much of that resource being exported.”85 After noting
that transporting oil by rail is not a viable option to expand oil sands
development and ensure that “Canada’s oil”86 gets to foreign markets (a
point I will return to below), the *OREH concluded “pipelines must be
built.”87
Over the next three years (2013–2016), the Trans Mountain pipeline
expansion proposal attracted considerably less attention than the longerrunning Northern Gateway and Keystone XL proposals. In the *OREH’s
comparison of the three pipeline proposals, it considered Trans Mountain
to be the least controversial because the proposal consisted largely in
constructing a new pipeline along the very same route of a still-operational
pipeline.88
1RUWKHUQ*DWHZD\
The Northern Gateway proposal, by contrast, was highly controversial
and contested vigorously from the very moment it was proposed. The
Northern Gateway project consisted of constructing and operating a
1,170 km, 525,000 barrel per day crude oil pipeline along with a 193,000
barrel per day condensate pipeline between Bruderheim, Alberta and the
port of Kitimat, British Columbia, where a marine terminal would have

84. ,ELG.
85. “Editorial: Northern Gateway: A long way yet to cross the Paci¿c,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(19
December 2013), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/northern-gateway-along-way-yet-to-cross-the-paci¿c/article16064628/> [perma.cc/7KD3-LAAF].
86. ,ELGThe *OREH’sstaff columnists have also consistently made the same point. See e.g. Gary
Mason, “Sorry, Vancouver: The rest of Canada needs pipelines,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(2 December
2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/sorry-vancouver-the-rest-of-canadaneeds-pipelines/article33123104/> [perma.cc/4XA5-NGVB].
87. ,ELG
88. “Editorial: Northern Gateway: A long way yet to cross the Paci¿c,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(19
December 2013), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/northern-gateway-along-way-yet-to-cross-the-paci¿c/article16064628/> [perma.cc/K5X7-RRR4].
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been constructed.89 The pipeline would have traversed the Great Bear
Rainforest in British Columbia, an area of remarkable biodiversity that
has been effectively managed and conserved by Indigenous peoples for
thousands of years.90 A signi¿cant oil spill in this area, it was feared, would
cause irreparable harm to the environment and the traditional ways of life
of local Indigenous peoples.
Beginning in 2010, the Northern Gateway proposal was subjected
to an environmental assessment conducted by a Joint Review Panel
struck by the federal Minister of the Environment and the NEB.91 The
federal government issued an Order in Council directing the NEB to issue
Certi¿cates of Public Convenience in respect of the project pursuant to the
National Energy Board Act subject to 209 conditions recommended by the
Joint Review Panel.92 Environmental and Indigenous groups commenced a
judicial review of the Order in Council, the ¿nal report of the Joint Review
Panel (which the Governor in Council considered in making its Order),
and the Certi¿cates issued by the NEB.
While the judicial review of Northern Gateway was still ongoing—
“still languishing” in the Globe’s opinion—the federal government
announced its supplemental review of the Trans Mountain expansion
proposal introduced above in the previous section of this article.93 In an
editorial entitled “It’s time to get the Trans Mountain pipeline approved,”94
the Globe suggested that the additional review was welcome, “even if it
does come over and above the work of the National Energy Board, which
made its essentially favourable report on the pipeline”95 after the “NEB had
been working away for three years.”96 Meanwhile, as the NEB continued
its ongoing review of TransCanada’s Energy East pipeline proposal, the
Globe’s editorial page expressed its “hope the Liberal government doesn’t
add yet another extra review for that eastbound project.”97
89. For further details about the Northern Gateway pipeline proposal and its assessment, see
Government of Canada, “Joint Review Panel for Northern Gateway Project,” online: <https://www.
canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/06/joint-review-panel-northern-gateway-project.html>
[perma.
cc/4VBC-BNAR] [Government of Canada, “Northern Gateway”].
90. For an account of how the imperatives of conservation and reconciliation intersect in this region,
see Deborah Curran, “‘Legalizing’ the Great Bear Rainforest Agreements: Colonial Adaptations
Toward Reconciliation and Conservation” (2017) 62:3 McGill LJ 813.
91. Government of Canada, “Northern Gateway,” supra note 89.
92. Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at para 51 [Gitxaala].
93. “Editorial: It’s time to get the Trans Mountain pipeline approved,” The Globe and Mail (22
May 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/its-time-to-get-the-transmountain-pipeline-approved/article30107212/> [perma.cc/U8XL-NSFJ].
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid. The Energy East proposal consisted in converting an approximately 3,000km natural gas
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Shortly thereafter, the judicial review of Northern Gateway concluded.
In the *LW[DDOD decision, the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the federal
Cabinet’s Order in Council.98 The Court found that the federal government
fell far short of the mark of satisfying its constitutional duty to consult
and accommodate affected Indigenous groups.99 The Court’s reasoning in
*LW[DDOD—that the government failed to engage in meaningful dialogue
with affected Indigenous groups—anticipates the Court’s more recent
conclusion in 7VOHLO:DXWXWK regarding the consultation conducted in
respect of the Trans Mountain expansion proposal.100
The *OREH responded to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in
*LW[DDODby urging the federal government to press forward, stating that
the decision “doesn’t change the fact that Canada needs a way to get
Albertan oil to new markets, and that the most ef¿cient and safest way
to do that is via pipeline. The best bet now is Kinder Morgan’s Trans
Mountain project.”101
.H\VWRQH;/
The Keystone XL pipeline proposal, on the other hand, was just as
controversial as Northern Gateway. Keystone XL was opposed by
Indigenous groups whose lands and waters would be traversed by the
pipeline and threated by oil spills, though in contrast to Northern Gateway,
this opposition was concentrated more in the United States, where the
majority of the construction would occur, and whose president would
decide its fate. Environmental groups also opposed Keystone XL on
climate change grounds, which the *OREH characterized as “absurd.”102 US
president Barack Obama ¿rst vetoed a bill passed by the US Congress
approving Keystone XL,103 and ultimately rejected the pipeline proposal,

pipeline from Alberta to Ontario to a diluted bitumen pipeline, and the construction of an additional
1,600km pipeline from Ontario to port terminals and re¿neries in Quebec and New Brunswick. For
additional details, see Government of Canada, “Energy East Project,” online: <https://ceaa-acee.
gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/80073?culture=en-CA> [https://perma.cc/3CUX-LG2B].
98. *LW[DDODVXSUDnote 92 at para 333.
99. ,ELGat para 325.
100. 7VOHLO:DXWXWKVXSUDnote 69 at para 754.
101. “Editorial: Ottawa has to prove it can get a pipeline built,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(4 July 2016),
online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/ottawa-has-to-prove-it-can-get-apipeline-built/article30747419/> [perma.cc/W7C6-Q8SW].
102. “Editorial: What the election of Donald Trump means for Justin Trudeau,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO
(9 November 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/what-the-electionof-donald-trump-means-for-justin-trudeau/article32776713/> [perma.cc/74RX-5867] [*OREH “What
Trump means for Trudeau”].
103. See Paul Koring, “Obama vetoes promised Keystone XL pipeline bill,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(24
February 2015), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/obama-keystone-pipelinedecision/article23180005/> [perma.cc/YN44-FC9Q].
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both because its economic potential had been greatly exaggerated and
because it would contribute to climate change.104 President Obama’s
spokesperson explained that approving Keystone XL would “incentivize
the extraction of some of the dirtiest oil on the planet and…undermine the
case” for urgently cutting carbon emissions.105
That was the fall of 2015, during the negotiations of a United Nations
agreement on climate change in Paris. A year later, however, Donald Trump
was elected president of the United States. Trump had promised during his
campaign to reverse Obama’s decision on Keystone XL on his ¿rst day in
of¿ce. On 24 January 2017, Trump issued a series of executive memoranda
to revive the project.106 According to the *OREH, Trump’s promise to revive
Keystone XL was “a game-changer for the Canadian oil patch.”107 At the
same time, the *OREH was careful to caution that it remained to be seen how
Trump would follow through on that promise, and on what conditions.108
Shortly thereafter, in an assessment of Justin Trudeau’s ¿rst year in of¿ce
as prime minister, the *OREHclaimed that Trudeau’s “best moment came
near the end of 2016, when he announced his government’s decision to
approve the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion.”109
7UDQV0RXQWDLQH[SDQVLRQ
Despite the Trudeau government’s approval, Trans Mountain’s prospects
were soon threatened by the BC provincial election in the spring of 2017.
The *OREHonce again endorsed the Liberals. Regarding oil and pipelines,
the *OREH observed, the BC Liberals have “tried to strike a balance,
favouring new projects but demanding environmental assurances and
¿nancial returns.”110 Despite the federal government’s promise to spend
104. See Paul Koring, “Canada was irrelevant in Obama’s decision to reject Keystone XL pipeline,”
7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (6 November 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/
canada-was-irrelevant-in-obamas-decision-to-reject-keystone-xl-pipeline/article27164939/> [perma.
cc/A2GN-27WT].
105. ,ELG.
106. Adrian Morrow & Shawn McCarthy, “Trudeau welcomes Trump’s Keystone XL pipeline
revival,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(24 January 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/reporton-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/trump-sign-order-to-approve-keystone-xl-pipeline/
article33714341/> [perma.cc/QF83-KH8B].
107. “Editorial: What the election of Donald Trump means for Justin Trudeau (2),” 7KH*OREHDQG
0DLO (11 November 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/what-theelection-of-donald-trump-means-for-justin-trudeau-2/article32827172/> [perma.cc/E6KT-5CY6].
108. *OREH “What Trump means for Trudeau,” VXSUD note 102. At this writing the Keystone XL
project remains mired in legal proceedings in the United States.
109. “Globe editorial: Justin Trudeau’s 2016: A year of goals and own-goals,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO
(26 December 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/justin-trudeaus2016-a-year-of-goals-and-own-goals/article33419730/> [perma.cc/7TU4-9X9Y].
110. “Globe editorial: In B.C., hold your nose and vote Liberal,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(5 May 2017),
online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/globe-editorial-in-bc-hold-your-nose-
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a signi¿cant amount of money on spill prevention and remediation, the
*OREH added, “the [BC] NDP is still opposed.”111 In the *OREH’s opinion,
Trans Mountain was not in the least controversial: “There’s already an
existing pipe on the route, as has been for decades. At its terminus, there
are already tankers carrying oil from Burnaby to the sea. This is the least
intrusive pipeline proposal out there.”112 The stakes of QRW approving
the pipeline expansion, by contrast, were high. According to the *OREH:
“leaving Alberta oil landlocked and stuck in that province, due to an
inability to build the most safe and ef¿cient means of oil transport, would
be a shock to the economy.”113
The BC NDP secured a minority government by striking a cooperation
agreement with the Green Party, which effectively held the balance of
power after having won a record 17 percent of the vote and three seats
in the BC legislature.114 As a result, the *OREH argued, “what should be
Canada’s least controversial pipeline project is now in jeopardy. It spells
big trouble for Alberta’s and Ottawa’s plans for moving landlocked oil to
the Paci¿c. That could be a punch in the gut to the oil industry and a hit for
the Canadian economy.”115
Soon after the 2017 BC provincial election the *OREH published its
most substantial editorial on the issue of building new pipelines from
Alberta to tidewater.116 The *OREH began by describing a battle between
British Columbia and the federal government “that could have an indelible
impact on the future of Canada.”117 “The issue at hand is pipelines,”
the *OREH argued, and “[i]t comes down to one question: Can Ottawa
effectively exercise its responsibilities if the provinces refuse to recognize
its authority on controversial issues?”118 In the *OREH’s opinion, it was
clear and beyond reasonable argument that the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction over the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion, a
and-vote-liberal/article34906441/> [perma.cc/536K-TPD6].
111. ,ELG
112. “Globe editorial: On pipelines, it’s the Trudeau government’s choice, and it’s time to choose,” 7KH
*OREHDQG0DLO(21 May 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/globeeditorial-on-pipelines-its-the-trudeau-governments-choice-and-its-time-to-choose/article35066359/>
[perma.cc/9CD2-LGQR].
113. ,ELG
114. “Globe editorial: How B.C.’s election has changed everything,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(26 May
2017),
online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/globe-editorial-how-bcselection-has-changed-everything/article35125279/> [perma.cc/NXU5-AMBE].
115. ,ELG.
116. “Globe editorial: On pipelines, Ottawa must have the ¿nal say,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(4 June
2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/globe-editorial-on-pipelinesottawa-must-have-the-¿nal-say/article35194176/> [perma.cc/DVD7-QJPW].
117. ,ELG
118. ,ELG.
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project “critical to Canada’s resource-based economy.”119 The federal
government, the *OREH explained, has sole jurisdiction over railways,
canals, hydro lines, pipelines, and other forms of infrastructure that cross
provincial boundaries, as well as jurisdiction over seacoasts, navigation,
shipping, and trade and commerce.120
Nonetheless, the *OREH observed, the BC NDP and Greens were
preparing “to undertake a bureaucratic guerilla war”121 against the Trans
Mountain project through the use of “clever delay tactics for the sole purpose
of usurping the duly exercised authority of the federal government.”122
The *OREHfurther impugned the NDP-Green Party coalition government’s
opposition to Trans Mountain by alleging that the parties were positioning
themselves as “defenders” of BC’s coastal waters and, “by trying to block
the export of crude oil, they claim to be on the side of the angels in the
¿ght against climate change.”123
In the same editorial, the *OREH offered its threefold argument in favour
of completing the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion: (a) “Canada has to
continue to exist as a resource-based economy while it and the rest of the
world transition away from carbon;” (b) “oil sands crude will continue
to be shipped even without a pipe, by rail;” and (c) “pipelines are safer
than rail.”124 The *OREH immediately acknowledged “there is no question
that the product it transports will ultimately contribute to greenhouse gas
emissions,” but does not at any point in its Trans Mountain coverage to
date pursue this critically-important point further.125
Neither the NEB’s review nor the federal government’s supplemental
review of Trans Mountain meaningfully considered the project’s
implications for climate change nor, for that matter, the impact of
climate change policies on the long-term commercial viability of the
project. Attention to this gap in the government’s review and approval
of Trans Mountain emerged only indirectly as a byproduct of the federal
government’s decision during the summer of 2017 to direct the NEB to
enhance its review of TransCanada’s Energy East proposal by considering
its climate change impacts. The government directed the NEB to consider
not only the direct greenhouse gas emissions of the project (caused by
119. ,ELG.
120. ,ELG.
121. ,ELG.
122. ,ELG This statement predates the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in 7VOHLO:DXWXWK VXSUD
note 69, which would show that the federal government had not in fact duly exercised its authority
after all.
123. ,ELG
124. ,ELG
125. ,ELG
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its construction), but also its contribution to the upstream emissions
caused by the processing of extracted bitumen for shipment as well as the
downstream emissions caused by the end uses—the combustion—of the
oil transported by the pipeline.126 The government also instructed the NEB
to consider how the government’s own climate change policies—including
its greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets—would affect the project’s
commercial viability.127 In addition to its implications for Energy East,
this new mandate also indirectly threatened Trans Mountain, raising anew
unanswered questions about the project’s climate impacts and long-term
commercial viability in a carbon-constrained global economy.
In response to this added layer of scrutiny, Energy East’s proponent,
TransCanada Corp., decided to withdraw its application to the NEB. The
*OREH’s reaction was pointed: “this was a business decision taken by an
industry that’s been forced to swim in a sea of politics.”128 Citing estimates
provided by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP,
the principal lobbyist for the Canadian oil and gas industry) that even
under low-price scenarios Canada’s oil sands production was forecasted
to rise by an additional 1.3 million barrels per day by 2030,129 the *OREH
reiterated its position that “Canada still needs extra pipeline capacity.”130
Absent any mention of climate change or Canada’s greenhouse gas
emissions reduction targets, the *OREH argued that Canada “has to be
capable of making evidence-based decisions on projects of national
bene¿t, and making those decisions stick.”131 The evidence referred to by
the *OREHconcerned not climate change, but rather the oil and gas sector’s
own forecast of increased oil sands production: “absent another sustained
drop in the oil price, or a prolonged global recession, Keystone XL alone
can’t suck up all of the new Canadian oil coming on-stream. That’s why
Kinder Morgan proposed Trans Mountain’s expansion, and that’s why the
Liberals approved it.”132
126. See Mike Hager, “National Energy Board defends Trans Mountain pipeline review,” 7KH*OREH
DQG 0DLO (31 August 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/
national-energy-board-defends-trans-mountain-review/article36142237/> [perma.cc/BJ5T-YZX6].
127. ,ELG
128. “Globe editorial: The death of Energy East was a business decision—swimming in politics,”
7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (5 October 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/
editorials/globe-editorial-the-death-of-energy-east-was-a-business-decision-swimming-in-politics/
article36508575/> [perma.cc/5SCN-AKB3].
129. ,ELG
130. ,ELG
131. ,ELG
132. “Editorial: The Trudeau government made a decision on Trans Mountain. Now it has to make
it stick,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (11 November 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/editorials/the-trudeau-government-made-a-decision-on-trans-mountain-now-it-has-to-make-
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In early 2018, yet another indirect threat to Trans Mountain arose in
the form of British Columbia’s proposed oil spill response and recovery
regulations introduced above in the previous section of this article. “The
project took a serious hit,” the *OREH’s editorial page noted, “when
B.C. released a proposal to restrict ‘the increase of diluted bitumen
transportation’ in the province until the government completes studies on
how ‘dilbit,’ the tarry crude extracted from Alberta’s oil sands and diluted
so it can Àow through a pipe, behaves in water in the event of a spill.”133 In
the *OREH¶s view, British Columbia’s proposal was nothing more than—
the pun presumably intended—a crude delay tactic, especially in light of
the *OREH¶s claim that “the buoyancy of dilbit has already been subject to
years of research,” a “fact” the *OREH claimed was “besides the point.”134
Anticipating its future coverage of the Trans Mountain project, the *OREH
reiterated its position that “the approval of pipelines is without question
the jurisdiction of the federal government, as is control over coastal
waterways” and concluded that it “would be disastrous if a province
were allowed to pretend to recognize that authority while shamelessly
undermining it.”135
In response to British Columbia’s proposed oil spill response and
recovery regulations, Kinder Morgan decided to suspend all non-essential
spending on the Trans Mountain expansion, and further threatened to
abandon the project outright unless the federal government guaranteed
its ultimate approval.136 Kinder Morgan’s announcement, in the editorial
opinion of the *OREH, was “nothing short of an economic and constitutional
disaster for Canada.”137 The *OREH accused British Columbia of “naked
hypocrisy.”138 Noting that the province’s opposition to the Trans Mountain
it-stick/article36922309/> [perma.cc/U3SH-GPVN]. As noted in the previous section, the Trans
Mountain pipeline expansion has yet to be assessed in terms of either its contribution to greenhouse
gas emissions or the risks to its long-term commercial viability posed by the prospect of increasingly
stringent climate change policies and regulations, including greenhouse gas emissions reduction
targets. While Kinder Morgan performed a carbon-risk analysis when it issued shares to Kinder
Morgan Canada Limited in 2017, its analysis did not include any analysis of the project’s commercial
viability in the event that oil demand peaked or declined after the year 2030. See McCarthy, “Ottawa
won’t disclose carbon risk of Trans Mountain,” VXSUDnote 66.
133. “Globe editorial: Trudeau must stand up to B.C.’s crude tactics,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(1 February
2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/globe-editorial-trudeau-muststand-up-to-bcs-crude-tactics/article37825229/> [perma.cc/7WAG-Q2AA].
134. ,ELG.
135. ,ELG.
136. “Globe editorial: Trans Mountain is now an economic and constitutional disaster,” 7KH*OREH
DQG0DLO(8 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globeeditorial-bc-governments-pipeline-hypocrisy-could-come-back/> [perma.cc/BZK4-YTQ8].
137. ,ELG
138. ,ELG.
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expansion was based on “its stated desire to protect the environment,”139
the *OREH observed that the province was at the same time “supporting the
development of the province’s natural-gas reserves, offering tax breaks to
a $40-billion project that includes, wait for it, a new pipeline and a new
tanker terminal on the B.C. coast.”140 British Columbia, in the *OREH’s
opinion, was precipitating an economic and constitutional crisis “in the
name of environmental principles it only adheres to when it is in its
political interest, but abandons when it sees a dollar in it.”141
The *OREH further accused British Columbia of hypocrisy when the
province ¿led suit to prevent Alberta’s threat to restrict the supply of oil and
gas to British Columbia in retaliation for British Columbia’s proposed oil
spill response and recovery regulations from coming to pass.142 According
to the *OREH, by ¿ling suit, British Columbia “has been forced to admit
that fossil fuels are an essential part of peoples’ lives, not to mention the
economy, and that the transition away from them will take time.”143 About
BC premier John Horgan, the *OREH said “he wants to save the planet; he’d
just really prefer it if others did the heavy lifting.”144
Upon the expiry of Kinder Morgan’s ultimatum, the federal
government decided to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline145 and
assume responsibility for completing its expansion subject to the approval
of Kinder Morgan’s shareholders, who would ultimately approve the sale
by a margin of 99.98 percent.146 While the *OREH wrote approvingly of the
government’s purchase of the pipeline—“remember that getting Alberta’s
crude to more foreign markets is critical to the country’s economic
interests”147—it worried that the government might mishandle the project:

139. ,ELG.
140. ,ELG.
141. ,ELG
142. “Globe editorial: Alberta scores a point with threat of oil embargo,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(23
May 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorialalberta-scores-a-point-with-threat-of-oil-embargo/> [perma.cc/RFB4-2EPP] [*OREH“Alberta scores
a point”].
143. ,ELG.
144. ,ELG
145. “Globe editorial: Ottawa throws your money at its pipeline problem,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(29
May 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorialottawa-throws-your-money-at-its-pipeline-problem/> [perma.cc/PWK9-PDB9] [*OREH, “Ottawa
purchases Trans Mountain”].
146. Andrew Willis, “Ottawa stuck with Trans Mountain pipeline other investors wisely rejected,” 7KH
*OREHDQG0DLO(30 August 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/
article-corporate-canada-dodges-a-bullet-on-trans-mountain-while-ottawa-takes/> [perma.cc/FT4EVKPR].
147. *OREH, “Ottawa purchases Trans Mountain,” VXSUDnote 145.
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Among other things, the Trans Mountain expansion has sparked
demonstrations at which people have been arrested. That raises the
question of whether or not Mr. Trudeau has the stomach for watching
Canadians get manacled on his government’s behalf, not to mention for
telling indigenous communities that the pipeline is going through their
land whether they like it or not, or for being attacked for being on the
wrong side in the ¿ght against climate changeRQHRIKLVSHWLVVXHV148

“Then there is the fact,” the *OREH added, cryptically, “that
governments are captive to different forces than private companies.”149
(Voters, perhaps?)
Coincidentally, on the same day the shareholders of Kinder Morgan
Canada Limited approved the sale of Trans Mountain to the federal
government, the Federal Court of Appeal issued its decision quashing the
government’s initial approval of the project.150 The *OREH¶s response to
the Court’s decision, seemingly yet another setback for the project, was
decidedly more sanguine than its responses to the project’s previous
setbacks. In its initial editorial response to the Federal Court of Appeal’s
decision, the *OREH reiterated its threefold argument in favour of Trans
Mountain’s expansion and made two speci¿c additional points. First,
the *OREH stated “there is no reason the NEB can’t meet the court’s
requirement to properly assess the impact of increased tanker traf¿c. The
NEB might even ¿nd that the mitigation efforts already undertaken by
the federal government are adequate.”151 Second, the *OREHadded “as for
consultations with Indigenous people, the NEB clearly needs to do better.
But no one should mistake the right to be duly consulted with a veto.”152
In a follow-up editorial published a day later, the *OREH emphasized
that the Federal Court of Appeal in 7VOHLO:DXWXWK concluded that because
the concerns of affected Indigenous groups in respect of the Trans
Mountain expansion were speci¿c and focused, “[t]he end result may be a
148. ,ELG [emphasis added]. As provocative as this phraseology is, the *OREHs editorial page has
also written approvingly—if far less frequently—of the federal government’s leadership “on what
should be considered one of humanity’s de¿ning challenges—arresting man-made climate change that
threatens the planet’s very future”: “Globe editorial: Trudeau’s Liberals need to step up their efforts to
sell carbon pricing,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(10 August 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-trudeaus-liberals-need-to-step-up-their-efforts-to/>
[perma.cc/V9Y3-S3NH] [*OREH“Liberals need to sell carbon pricing”].
149. ,ELG.
150. 7VOHLO:DXWXWKVXSUDnote 69.
151. *OREH“The problem isn’t the pipeline,” VXSUDnote 78. This argument ignores the fact, however,
that the Federal Court of Appeal carefully considered the federal government’s Oceans Protection
Plan, but found it to be an inchoate initiative and insuf¿cient to serve as a meaningful response to
affected Indigenous group’s concerns about diluted bitumen spills: 7VOHLO:DXWXWKVXSUDnote 69 at
para 471.
152. ,ELG.
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short delay.”153 As noted at the outset of this section, the Globe discounted
the importance of the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision, and asserted
“there is every reason to be con¿dent the people’s pipeline will get built
after a few more hurdles are cleared.”154 “The national interest,” the Globe
reiterated, “is served by the project going ahead as soon as possible.”155
If national polling is any indication, a majority of Canadians appear to
share the Globe’s view of the national interest. In a poll of 1,500 Canadians
conducted in 2016, 86 percent of respondents—including majorities in each
geographic region of Canada—supported a plan to shift Canada’s energy
use over the coming decades, including promoting cleaner transportation
and buildings, and pricing carbon to encourage a shift toward greater use
of cleaner energy.156 After posing the question about this proposed shift, the
pollsters asked respondents the following question: “Let’s imagine while
putting in place these measures to encourage a shift to renewable energy,
the federal government also approved a new pipeline to get Canada’s oil
and gas to new markets, would you strongly support, support, accept,
oppose, or strongly oppose such a decision?”157 The results were 41 percent
in support of the proposal with an additional 35 percent prepared to accept
it, with only 23 percent opposed. The poll’s authors concluded that “there
is a path to creating more comprehensive national support, with a blend
of carbon pricing, incentives to promote a shift in energy use, and adding
pipeline capacity to get Canada’s oil to markets while a shift towards more
renewable energy is underway.”158
More recent polling reinforces this view. In a survey conducted
by Nanos Research on behalf of the University of Ottawa’s Positive
Energy initiative, 55 percent of respondents agreed and an additional 29
percent “somewhat agreed” that Canada’s oil and gas sector can play an
important long-term role domestically and internationally if it operates
in an environmentally responsible way. Further, nearly 75 percent of
those Canadians surveyed believe that Canada’s oil and gas exports can
contribute to combatting global climate change.159
153. Globe, “Lashing out won’t save the people’s pipeline,” supra note 80; Tsleil-Waututh, supra note
69 at para 772.
154. Globe, “Lashing out won’t save the people’s pipeline,” supra note 80.
155. Globe, “The way forward,” supra note 81.
156. Bruce Anderson & David Coletto, “Climate, Carbon, and Pipelines: A Path to Consensus,”
Abacus Data (18 October 2016), online: <http://abacusdata.ca/climate-carbon-and-pipelines-a-pathto-consensus/> [perma.cc/ZXE9-USEL].
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid [emphasis added].
159. Monica Gattinger & Nik Nanos, “Canadians back Ottawa on energy projects, but seek balance,”
The Globe and Mail (17 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/articlecanadians-back-ottawa-on-energy-projects-but-seek-balance/> [perma.cc/6799-F3ER]. See also Tony
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4. /HWWHUWRWKHHGLWRU([SRVLQJSLSHOLQHSURSDJDQGDDQGFOLPDWH
LQDFWLRQ
A letter to the editor published by the *OREH in the spring of 2018 neatly
summarizes the *OREH’s editorial coverage of the Trans Mountain pipeline
expansion, notably its characterization of the project as being in the
“national interest”:
Repeating phrases turns them into clichés, expressions requiring minimal
reÀection, often used by leaders to create mindsets and attitudes, easily
weaponized…. Instead of using the “national interest” as a sledgehammer,
engage in evidence-based conversations: the actual product (dilbit), the
carbon footprint, pollution, job numbers, risks, alternative solutions.160

This letter writer’s summary closely tracks the media “propaganda model”
described above in section II of the article. Before applying that model to
the *OREH’s editorial coverage of Trans Mountain, however, it is important
to ¿rst engage in the evidence-based dialogue rightly suggested by the
letter writer. In particular, it is important to assess whether the *OREH’s
threefold argument in favour of the Trans Mountain expansion is supported
by evidence.
a. 3LSHOLQHVVXSSRUW&DQDGD¶VWUDQVLWLRQDZD\IURPIRVVLOIXHOV
The *OREH’s ¿rst argument in favour of building new pipelines from the
oil sands to coastal tidewaters is that Canada must continue to exist as
a resource-based (i.e. oil-and-gas-based) economy while Canada and the
rest of the world transition away from fossil fuels. The reality, however, is
that neither Canada nor “the world” is presently engaged in anything that
can fairly be characterized as a transition away from fossil fuels.
Canada is not presently on track to meet the initial greenhouse gas
emissions reduction target it set pursuant to its entrance into the Paris
climate change agreement: A 30 percent reduction by the year 2030 relative
to its greenhouse gas emissions in the baseline year of 2005. Canada is
presently on pace to exceed its 2005-level of greenhouse gas emissions
in the year 2030 by as much as 30 percent. In fact, Canada’s greenhouse
gas emissions LQFUHDVHG in 2017,161 and, according to a report authored by
Coulson, “Canadians remain on board with energy projects,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(31 August 2018),
online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-canadians-remain-onboard-with-energy-projects/> [perma.cc/54PT-RXV4].
160. Clarence Bolt, “Letter to the editor,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(13 April 2018), online: <https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/opinion/letters/article-april-13-trans-mountain-just-what-is-in-the-nationalinterest/> [perma.cc/NKW8-6QSG].
161. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators:
Greenhouse gas emissions” (Ottawa, 2019) at 17 [Environment and Climate Change Canada,
“Greenhouse gas emissions”].

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

federal government scientists and academics, Canada is warming at twice
the rate of the rest of the world, and nearly three times the global rate in
the Arctic.162
In 2017, the Commissioner observed that “in two important areas—
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the impacts of climate
change—the federal government has yet to do much of the hard work that
is required to bring about this fundamental shift.”163
Making matters worse, Canada does not presently have a plan to meet
its 2030 emissions target, which is already a scienti¿cally XQDPELWLRXV
emissions-reduction target. In 2018 a government audit coordinated by
Canada’s Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development
of the climate change mitigation and adaptation policies presently in place
in Canada issued the following stark warning:
Canada’s auditors general found that most governments in Canada were
not on track to meet their commitments to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and were not ready for the impacts of climate change. On the
basis of current federal, provincial, and territorial policies and actions,
Canada is not expected to meet its 2020 target for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. 0HHWLQJ &DQDGD¶V  WDUJHW ZLOO UHTXLUH VXEVWDQWLDO
HIIRUW DQG DFWLRQV EH\RQG WKRVH FXUUHQWO\ SODQQHG RU LQ SODFH Most
Canadian governments have not assessed and, therefore, do not fully
understand what risks they face and what actions they should take to
adapt to a changing climate.164

The Commissioner reached the same conclusion again in 2019.165
Nor is the federal government presently prepared to contribute to
the implementation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, which consists of 17 aspirational sustainable development
162. Jeff Lewis & Janice Dickson, “Report on climate change shows Canada warming at twice the
rate of rest of world,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (1 April 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/canada/article-report-on-climate-change-shows-canada-warming-at-twice-the-rate-of/> [perma.
cc/TE2P-ZN8U]. The report referred to in the *OREH’s news story is Natural Resources Canada,
“Canada’s Changing Climate Report” (April 2019), online: <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/environment/
impacts-adaptation/21177> [perma.cc/YCJ2-PM8H].
163. Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, “The Commissioner’s
Perspective” (October 2017), online: <http://publications.gc.ca/site/archivee-archived.html?url=http://
publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/bvg-oag/FA1-26-2017-1-0-eng.pdf>
[perma.cc/
YVR3-EN5K].
164. Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, “Perspectives on Climate
Change Action in Canada—A Collaborative Report from Auditors General—March 2018” (27 March
2018), online: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_otp_201803_e_42883.html> [perma.
cc/7XUA-TDLF].
165. Jeff Lewis, “Canada not doing enough to ¿ght climate change, federal environment commissioner
warns,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (2 April 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/
article-canada-isnt-doing-enough-to-¿ght-climate-change-federal-environment/> [perma.cc/3UNVAJGQ].
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goals (SDGs) directed toward achieving socially, economically, and
environmentally sustainable development worldwide. According to the
Commissioner, Canada has “not adequately prepared to implement the
United Nations 2030 Agenda.”166 Speci¿cally, the Commissioner found
that “there was no governance structure and limited national consultation
and engagement on the 2030 Agenda. There was no implementation plan
with a system to measure, monitor, and report on progress nationally.”167
Nor, ¿nally, can it be claimed that “the world” is presently transitioning
away from fossil fuels. No major industrialized country is presently on
pace to meet its initial greenhouse gas emissions reduction target under
the Paris climate change agreement.168 Moreover, according to the
International Energy Agency (IEA), the global transformation toward a
clean energy system is not presently in line with stated international policy
goals.169 As reported by 7KH (FRQRPLVW in 2018, rising global energy
demand is causing a corresponding increase in the use of fossil fuels.170
Most strikingly, in its special report on global warming of 1.5 degrees
Celsius, the highly ambitious and aspirational target of the Paris Climate
Agreement, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
underscored the urgent need for the global community to undertake rapid,
systemic, and unprecedented changes in how governments, industries, and
societies function in order to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above
the pre-industrial norm and thereby increase the likelihood of staving off
the most catastrophic impacts of climate change.171
The *OREH’s ¿rst argument in favour of the Trans Mountain expansion
project is thus materially inaccurate and misleading. Neither Canada nor
166. Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, “Report2—Canada’s
Preparedness to Implement the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals” (24 April 2018),
online: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att__e_43001.html> [perma.cc/TSD9-PYER].
167. ,ELG.
168. Climate Action Tracker, “Improvement in warming outlook as India and China move ahead, but
Paris Agreement gap still looms large” (14 November 2017), online: <https://climateactiontracker.org/
press/improvement-warming-outlook-india-and-china-move-ahead-paris-agreement-gap-still-loomslarge/> [perma.cc/499N-HGKP].
169. International Energy Agency, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2017: Catalysing Energy
Technology Transformations” (OECD/IEA, 2017), online: <https://www.iea.org/etp/> [perma.cc/
SP55-A9DM].
170. “The world is losing the war against climate change,” 7KH(FRQRPLVW(2 August 2018), online:
<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/08/02/the-world-is-losing-the-war-against-climatechange> [perma.cc/55QR-TF2L].
171. UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming of 1.5º C: Summary for
Policymakers” (November 2018), online: <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/summary-for-policymakers/> [perma.cc/BB27-F242]. For a preliminary analysis of the implications of this report for
Canada’s current climate change policies, see Jason MacLean, “The problem with Canada’s gradual
climate policy,” 3ROLF\2SWLRQV(26 October 2018), online: <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/
october-2018/the-problem-with-canadas-gradual-climate-policy/> [perma.cc/987E-3X6L].

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

the world is yet transitioning toward a low-to-zero-carbon economy. The
Globe’s assertion that such a transition is already underway, however,
gives the impression that more radical decarbonization measures are
presently unnecessary. This mischaracterization tacitly legitimizes climate
inaction in the short-to-medium term. It also effectively discourages—if
not outright precludes—reasoned discussion and debate about the kinds
of decarbonization policies that Canada should be urgently pursuing now
(e.g. building, instead of new diluted bitumen pipelines, long-distance
transmission lines capable of carrying zero-carbon electricity).
Indeed, on this particular point the Globe is explicit. In an editorial
on Bill C-69 and its proposal of a new Impact Assessment Act to replace
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 enacted by the Harper
government, the Globe offers the following opinion:
Major pipeline and other resource projects should be judged on their
impact on their immediate environment and on Indigenous peoples, and
on the possibility of mitigating impacts that cannot be avoided….Things
like downstream greenhouse-gas emissions, or “the intersection of sex
and gender with other identity factors,” as the law proposes, should be
kept out of the discussion.172

The Globe’s argument also obscures the crucially inconvenient fact
that the construction of new oil sands pipelines does not merely “continue”
current levels of oil sands production, Canada’s largest and fastest-growing
source of greenhouse gas emissions;173 instead, the construction of a new
pipeline to tidewater would facilitate the expansion of oil sands production,
and such expansion is directly at odds with transitioning toward a low-tozero-carbon economy.174 In the Globe’s editorial propaganda, however,
172. “Editorial: A Pipeline bill with too many holes in it,” The Globe and Mail (12 March 2019),
online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-¿xing-thepipeline-bill-while-its-still-in-the/> [perma.cc/H5KC-BK4X] [emphasis added].
173. See Bora Plumptre, “Three takeaways from Canada’s latest greenhouse gas emissions data: What
we’ve learned from this year’s National Inventory Report” (12 July 2018), Pembina Institute (blog),
online: <http://www.pembina.org/blog/three-takeaways-canadas-latest-greenhouse-gas-emissionsdata> [perma.cc/39PG-JKA9]. See also Environmental Defence & Stand.Earth, “Canada’s Oil & Gas
Challenge: A Summary Analysis of Rising Oil and Gas Industry Emissions in Canada and Progress
Towards Meeting Climate Targets” (2018) at 2, reporting that the oil and gas sector is “the largest
and fastest growing source of GHG emissions in Canada,” online: <https://environmentaldefence.ca/
report/canadas-oil-and-gas-challenge/> [perma.cc/2UYF-QVSR].
174. See e.g. Mark Jaccard, “Trudeau’s Orwellian logic: We reduce emissions by increasing them,”
The Globe and Mail (20 February 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/
trudeaus-orwellian-logic-reduce-emissions-by-increasing-them/article38021585/>
[perma.cc/
M3WM-HTSD] [Jaccard, “Trudeau’s Orwellian logic”]. According to scenarios developed by the
relatively conservative International Energy Agency, the demand for oil must peak soon after the year
2020 in order to be consistent with the decarbonization pathways required to meet the temperature
goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. See Caroline Lee, “Commentary: Where are we on the road to
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the complementary policy option of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
by way of both supply-side measures,175 such as a moratorium on new
fossil fuels infrastructure paired with the phased-out retirement of existing
fossil fuels infrastructure,176 and demand-side measures at the point of
combustion, such as pricing carbon, is so “absurd”177 as to be unthinkable,
and thus outside of what Herman and Chomsky describe as “the system of
presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system
so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”178
Perhaps concerned that its heretofore separate Trans Mountain
pipeline and carbon price editorials’ “choices, emphases, and omissions”179
were proving too subtle, or perhaps out of a concern over the federal
government’s further delay in (yet again) approving the Trans Mountain
pipeline (“Trans Mountain’s long imprisonment in limbo”180), the Globe
published an editorial in the spring of 2019 seeking to end the debate
once and for all. In “Yes to both carbon taxes and pipelines,” the Globe
declared “Canada can cut greenhouse gas emissions while building
pipelines. Canada can lower greenhouse gas emissions while allowing the
oil industry to grow.”181
Would that it were so simple.
How does the Globe rationalize what Canadian energy economist
Mark Jaccard characterizes as the oil and gas sector’s—and the Prime
Minister’s—Orwellian logic?182 According to the Globe, “because oil
clean energy?,” International Energy Agency Newsroom (4 May 2018), online: <https://www.iea.org/
newsroom/news/2018/may/commentary-where-are-we-on-the-road-to-clean-energy.html> [perma.
cc/2KM6-DVYP].
175. See e.g. Michael Lazarus & Harro van Asselt, “Fossil fuel supply and climate policy: exploring
the road less taken” (2018) 150 Climatic Change 1 [Lazarus & van Asselt, “Fossil fuel supply and
climate policy”].
176. See e.g. Christopher J Smith et al, “Current fossil fuel infrastructure does not yet commit is to
1.5º C warming” (2019) 10:101 Nature Communications 1, doi:10.1038/s41467-018-07999-w; see
also Wendy J Palen et al, “Energy: Consider the global impacts of oil pipelines” (2014) 510 Nature
465, doi:10.1038/510465a.
177. Globe, “What Trump means for Trudeau,” supra note 102.
178. Herman & Chomsky, supra note 20 at 302.
179. Ibid at xi.
180. “Editorial: Yes to both carbon taxes and pipelines,” The Globe and Mail (2 May 2019), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-no-you-dont-have-to-choose-canadashould-say-yes-to-both-carbon/> [perma.cc/6ZR8-F8XM] [Globe, “Yes to both carbon taxes and
pipelines”].
181. Ibid [emphasis added]. The title of the editorial’s online version (the Globe’s print and online
editorial and other article titles frequently diverge, at least partially) is even more telling: “No, you
don’t have to choose. Canada should say ‘Yes’ to both carbon taxes and pipelines.”
182. Jaccard, “Trudeau’s Orwellian logic,” supra note 174. Political scientist Kathryn Harrison likens
this so-called strategy of expanding oil production to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to “eating
more cake to build up strength to go on a diet”: Kathryn Harrison, “How ‘serious’ is a climate plan
that relies on pipelines?,” National Observer (4 July 2019), online: <https://www.nationalobserver.
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blocked from one source ends up being replaced by another, it’s an entirely
symbolic gesture” to oppose the construction of new pipelines.183 “And
in an oil-producing country such as Canada,” the *OREH adds, “stopping
a needed pipeline is not just an empty gesture, but counter-productive. It
does nothing for the environment, while placing a big fat minus sign on
the economic side of the ledger.”184
The *OREH’s bald, unsubstantiated logic is an example of the tenuous
assumption in neoclassical economics of “perfect substitution.”185 In the
absence of an actor capable of setting and controlling market prices,
however, this assumption simply does not hold.186 Just as in other markets,
reducing the supply of oil and gas by limiting the development of those
resources’ production and transmission infrastructure will tend to increase
their prices and, in turn, UHGXFH their demand.187
The *OREH¶s logic more likely stems from a strategic bet that other oiland-gas-producing countries will effectively defect from the Paris Climate
Agreement. Assuming, DUJXHQGR, that such a bet is a safe one, does it
logically—let alone morally—follow that Canada too should defect, rather
than attempt to lead by example as a climate policy innovator? On this
point the *OREH is explicit: “as long as the world uses oil, Canada should
continue to produce it.”188
Thus far, owing largely to the outsized political inÀuence of entrenched
special interests, supply-side climate policy measures represent the road

com/2019/07/04/opinion/how-serious-climate-plan-relies-pipelines> [perma.cc/6USQ-QYEV].
183. Lazarus & van Asselt, “Fossil fuel supply and climate policy,” VXSUDnote 175 at 5.
184. ,ELG.
185. ,ELG
186. ,ELG. While the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Canada is
QRW a member, attempts to play this price-controlling role in the global oil market, its ability to do is
increasingly in question (and in any event has never been complete). See e.g. Thijs Van de Graaf, “Is
OPEC dead? Oil exporters, the Paris agreement and the transition to a post-carbon world” (2017) 23
Energy Res Soc Sci 182.
187. Lazarus & van Asselt, “Fossil fuel supply and climate policy,” VXSUDnote 175 at 5.
188. Editorial, “Canada needs higher crude prices, and that means pipelines,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO
(1 August 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-canada-needshigher-crude-prices-and-that-means-pipelines/> [perma.cc/2S9W-KFZM] [*OREH “Canada needs
higher crude prices”]. Note that the quote continues as follows: “even as we bring in policies to
discourage its use, or make it cleaner.” But no such policies are being brought in. Oil sands production
is Canada’s largest and fastest growing source of greenhouse gas emissions, and it is a signi¿cant
source of global greenhouse gas emissions. Canada’s crude oil is among the most carbon-intensive in
the world, ranking below only Venezuela in terms of major oil-producing countries. See John Liggio HW
DO, “Measured Canadian oil sands C02 emissions are higher than estimates made using internationally
recommended methods” (2019) Nature Communications 10:1863, https://doi.org/10:1038/s41467019-09714-9; Mohammad S Masnadi HWDO, “Global carbon intensity of crude oil production” (2018)
361:6405 Science 851 at 852; Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Greenhouse gas emissions,”
VXSUDnote 161 at 7-8.
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less taken.189 But this need not be the case. Supply-side climate change
policies have been shown to promote climate change mitigation in a
number of ways, including by: (a) increasing the scale of emissions
reductions available at a given marginal cost, thereby “widening” the
mitigation cost curve by expanding the range of abatement measures
available to policymakers;190 (b) slowing investment in fossil fuel
production and transmission infrastructure, thereby reducing “carbon
lock-in” and overproduction;191 (c) increasing moral pressure and public
support for climate action by making such action more readily observable
by the public, because such actions are comparatively more certain and
exact as compared with ef¿ciency measures spread across an exponentially
larger number of individual investment and consumption decisions;192 (d)
reducing administrative and transaction costs, because fewer projects and
facilities produce fossil fuels than use them;193 and (e) diminishing the
incentive of fossil fuels producers to accelerate production in the near term
to avoid the sunk costs of stranded fossil fuels assets because they may, as a
matter of risk management, anticipate increasingly stringent carbon prices
in the medium-to-long term; this risk is known as the “green paradox” and
has also been described as a “sell-out” scenario.194
According to the *OREH, however, “pipelines have become a favourite
symbolic target and a litmus test of environmental commitment. A false
test.”195
According to a growing number of climate change policy scholars,
by contrast, “supply-side policies—from removing fossil fuel subsidies,
to taxing production, to retiring assets—have the potential to offer
governments valuable new tools to achieve climate goals and deserve a
closer look.”196

189. MacLean, “The Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law,” VXSUDnote 3.
190. Taren Fæhn HWDO“Climate policies in a fossil fuel producing country: demand versus supply
side policies” (2017) 38 Energy J 77.
191. Peter Erikson, Michael Lazarus & Kevin Tempest, “Carbon lock-in from fossil fuel supply
infrastructure” (Seattle, 2015) Stockholm Environment Institute, online: <https://mediamanager.sei.
org/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-DB-2015-Carbon-lock-in-supply-side.pdf>.
192. Paul Collier & AJ Venables, “Closing coal: economic and moral incentives” (2014) 30 Ox Rev
Econ Policy 492.
193. Lazarus & van Asselt, “Fossil fuel supply and climate policy,” VXSUDnote 175 at 4.
194. Hans-Werner Sinn, “Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach” (2008) 15
Int Tax Public Finance 360; but see Nico Bauer HWDO, “Divestment prevails over the green paradox
when anticipating strong future climate policies” (2018) 8 Nature Climate Change 130. See also
Jean-Francois Mercure HWDO, “Macroeconomic impact of stranded fossil fuel assets” (2018) 8 Nature
Climate Change 588.
195. *OREH“Yes to both carbon taxes and pipelines,” VXSUDnote 180.
196. Lazarus & van Asselt, “Fossil fuel supply and climate policy,” VXSUDnote 175 at 5.
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b. (YHQZLWKRXWDQHZSLSHOLQHRLOVDQGVFUXGHZLOOEHVKLSSHGE\UDLO
The*OREH’s second and closely related argument in favour of the Trans
Mountain pipeline is essentially an argument of inevitability: Alberta’s oil
is going to be moved one way or another, whether by pipe or by rail.
Opposing pipeline construction is not an effective way of opposing oil
sands production, let alone mitigating climate change (a position, as noted
above, the *OREH characterizes as “absurd”). According to the *OREH
we should build new pipelines because pipelines are economically more
ef¿cient than rail and, in the *OREH’s third and closely related argument
(discussed below), pipelines are VDIHU than rail:
Environmental groups portray the Trans Mountain expansion, which
would triple the pipeline’s capacity, as a betrayal of Mr. Trudeau’s stated
desire to make Canada a leader in the ¿ght against climate change.
But that position doesn’t take into account the fact that Alberta oil will
still be produced and shipped without the pipeline expansion, only by the
far more dangerous method of rail transport.197

The *OREH¶s inevitability argument is not only misleading, it is also
contradicted by the *OREH’s other editorial commentary and its own
business reporting. The *OREH has consistently reported and expressed its
opinion that oil sands production cannot H[SDQG without the construction
of new pipelines (or added pipeline capacity). Representative articles
include “Canadian oil collapses amid pipeline and rail bottleneck,”198
“Oil sands glut set to worsen as output exceeds pipeline space,”199
“Pipeline constraints to cost Canadian economy $10.7-billion in 2018:
Scotiabank,”200 and “Trans Mountain’s failure would be costly for Canada,
Scotiabank CEO warns.”201
197. Editorial, “Can Trudeau keep his pipeline pact?,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(20 June 2019), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-ottawa-approves-a-pipeline-now-ithas-to-actually-build-it/> [perma.cc/PVB8-K7HJ].
198. Robert Tuttle, “Canadian oil collapses amid pipeline and rail bottleneck,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO
(12 December 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/inside-the-market/
market-updates/canadian-oil-collapses-amid-pipeline-and-rail-bottleneck/article37303601/> [perma.
cc/U23S-FSQB].
199. Jeff Lewis, “Oil-sands glut set to worsen as output exceeds pipeline space,” 7KH *OREH DQG
0DLO (15 December 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industrynews/energy-and-resources/oil-sands-price-discounts-expected-to-rise-as-output-exceeds-pipelinecapacity/article37342424/> [perma.cc/ND4F-F3KN].
200. Ian Bickis, “Pipeline constraints to cost Canadian economy $10.7-billion in 2018: Scotiabank,”
7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (20 February 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/industry-news/energy-and-resources/pipeline-constraints-to-cost-economy-107-billion-in2018-scotiabank/article38030883/> [perma.cc/UN6S-FLG9].
201. James Bradshaw, “Trans Mountain’s failure would be costly for Canada, Scotiabank CEO
warns,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(10 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/
article-trans-mountains-failure-would-be-costly-for-canada-scotiabank-ceo/>
[perma.cc/6PGF-
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Scotiabank’s logic, which is given ample voice by the *OREH, is
especially telling. In the fall of 2018, Canadian oil producers were missing
out on the then-latest surge in global crude prices, with Canadian heavy
oil—Western Canadian Select—being traded at a record-high discount
relative to the Western Texas Intermediate price benchmark. The cause,
according to Scotiabank, was that oil-by-rail services failed “to keep pace
with voracious demand for non-pipeline egress out of Western Canada.”202
The Bank of Montreal has similarly warned in the *OREH’s business
pages of “ugly consequences” if the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion is
not completed.203 In a related analysis, Capital Economics, an independent
economic research ¿rm cited by the *OREH,204 concluded that “without
added transportation [pipeline] capacity, there is a risk that the discount on
Canadian heavy oil could increase again.”205
Deloitte LLP reached the same conclusion. In analysis cited by the
*OREH, Deloitte concluded “[t]here simply isn’t enough pipeline or rail
shipment capacity to get all the Canadian crude to market, leaving Canadian
producers unable to take advantage of higher prices and LQFUHDVHGGHPDQG
in the United States as its economy continues to grow.”206
Perhaps the most telling illustration of this argument was the warning
issued by the president and CEO of the Royal Bank of Canada, Dave
McKay, in an op-ed published by the *OREH. According to McKay: “As
our [oil and gas] resources sector copes with a growing crisis, we worry
that Canada is not setting up our energy industry for growth and success
in a changing world.”207
WJBK].
202. Scotiabank, “Trade Fear Drags on Metal Demand Expectations, Canadian Crude Discounts
Swell as Rail Lags” (26 September 2018), online: <https://www.gbm.scotiabank.com/scpt/gbm/
scotiaeconomics63/SCPI_2018-09_26.pdf> [perma.cc/YX7L-NHTX].
203. Michael Babad, “BMO warns of ugly consequences in Trans Mountain pipeline project dies,”
7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(23 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/brie¿ng/
article-bmo-warns-of-vicious-fallout-if-trans-mountain-pipeline-project-dies/>
[perma.cc/GYK354NA].
204. ,ELG
205. ,ELG. It is interesting to note that in April 2018, the price of Alberta’s brand of heavy oil, Western
Canadian Select, was on the rise, which narrowed the discount relative to the US benchmark West
Texas Intermediate. But by September 2018 the discount was at a record high. In the interim, Canadian
pipeline capacity (in terms of infrastructure availability) remained constant. While an examination of
the variability of domestic and global oil prices is beyond the scope of this article, this discrepancy is
nonetheless suf¿cient to establish that the causal relationship that the *OREHposits between pipeline
capacity and the discount on Alberta’s heavy oil is overly simplistic and incomplete.
206. Shawn McCarthy, “Price of Canadian heavy oil hits 10-year low compared with benchmark WTI
crude,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(5 October 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/
article-price-of-canadian-heavy-oil-hits-10-year-low-compared-with-benchmark/> [perma.cc/YT2WHBZH].
207. Dave McKay, “The energy-hungry world isn’t waiting for Canada,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(3 April
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Rail transport’s inability to keep pace with growing oil sands
production belies the *OREH¶s repeated assertion that Alberta’s oil will
inevitably move one way or the other. If rail were really a ready—if not
perfect—substitute for pipelines, then rail transport would grow as much
as needed to meet increased demand and production, and to facilitate
shipment, not only to US re¿neries where the price of Canada’s heavy
oil is (sometimes) heavily discounted, but also to Canada’s Paci¿c coast
and ultimately to Asian markets, where a higher price for Canada’s oil
can DUJXDEO\ be had.208 Preferring pipelines to rail is not solely about
economic ef¿ciency;209 the preference for expanding pipeline capacity is
equally a preference for expanded, long-term oil sands SURGXFWLRQ. As the
*OREH itself explains, “[b]uilding pipelines to carry crude out of Alberta
is a long game.”210 By characterizing the choice as one between pipeline
and rail as a matter of relative economic ef¿ciency, however, the *OREH’s
editorial commentary obscures the policy issue’s otherwise clear climate
change implications, and as a result, its true costs and bene¿ts.
The *OREH¶s inevitability argument similarly obscures the fact that
there is nothing ¿xed or inevitable about the future global demand for oil
and gas. The IEA’s 2018 world energy outlook corroborates this point.
Commenting on the “huge gap” between the IEA’s “current policies
scenario”—i.e., business as usual—and its “sustainable development
scenario,” whereby accelerated clean energy transitions put the world on
track to meet ambitious goals for climate change mitigation, universal
access to energy, and clean air, the IEA explains that ³>Q@RQH RI WKHVH
SRWHQWLDOSDWKZD\VLVSUHRUGDLQHGDOODUHSRVVLEOH7KHDFWLRQVWDNHQE\
JRYHUQPHQWVZLOOEHGHFLVLYHLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKLFKSDWKZHIROORZ´211

2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-energy-hungryworld-isnt-waiting-for-canada/> [perma.cc/NB62-JJCD].
208. Note, however, that even this claim is disputed. Former CIBC World Markets Chief Economist
Jeff Rubin argues that “Asian markets have historically paid less, not more, than the United States
for heavy oil”: Jeff Rubin, “Morneau had better options for Canada’s energy sector,” 7KH*OREHDQG
0DLO(29 May 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-morneau-had-betteroptions-for-canadas-energy-sector/> [perma.cc/ZG4R-UVYW].
209. In fact, the selective and complementary use of rail transport to adjust to the inherent volatility
of supply and demand in the oil and gas sector is itself an arguably ef¿cient feature of oil transport
in North America. Rail functions, not necessarily as an alternative to pipelines, but as a complement
to pipelines. See Thomas R Covert & Ryan Kellogg, “Crude by Rail, Option Value, and Pipeline
Investment” (2017) NBER Working Paper No 23855, online: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23855>
[perma.cc/SCW8-QWY7].
210. “Editorial: Does Ottawa feel the pain in the oil patch?,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO(11 March 2019),
online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-does-ottawafeel-the-pain-in-albertas-oil-industry/> [perma.cc/6LWW-9XB9] [*OREH“Pain in the oil patch”].
211. International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2018: Executive Summary” (2018) at 1,
online: <www.iea.org/weo2018/> [perma.cc/RCF9-X8Q2].
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c. Pipeline transport is safer than rail transport
The Globe’s third and closely related claim, that transporting oil by
pipeline is safer than transporting oil by rail, is similarly misleading. An
apples-to-apples comparison is not possible. When pipelines leak, far
more oil is spilled as compared with rail accidents, but pipeline leaks are
unlikely to cause explosions. Rail car derailments are associated with a
greater chance of human harm and property destruction, but the resulting
spills are easier to contain and tend to cause less ecological harm (which
can also have signi¿cant, if indirect, adverse effects on public health).212
These differences aside, the harms associated with each of these modes of
oil transport can be substantial.
The Globe’s assertion that oil pipelines are safer than railway cars is
further misleading because it presents Canadians with what is a doubly
false choice. First, Canadians should not be forced to choose between
two highly risky options. From a public safety perspective, oil should not
move across Canada, whether by pipeline or rail, unless it can be moved
reasonably safely; the Globe’s reasoning that “the optics of shipping crude
by rail are not good in light of the Lac-Mégantic disaster” brings this false
and unacceptable public policy choice into stark relief.213
Moreover, the supposed choice between pipelines and rail as the only
options up for debate presupposes that oil should move in the ¿rst place.
This tacit presupposition obscures the more fundamental question of
whether moving oil at all, let alone moving more oil, is consistent with our
domestic economic interests, as well as our international obligations as a
country to mitigate global climate change.
d. The Globe’s pipeline coverage as media propaganda and regulatory
capture
Taken together, each of the elements of the Globe’s threefold argument
in favour of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion—and new pipeline
construction generally—is less an argument than an article of ideology.
The Globe’s editorial coverage of Trans Mountain certainly fails to
vindicate its own Editorial Code of Conduct. Not even remotely does
the Globe’s Trans Mountain coverage meet the standard of providing
212. See e.g. Tracy Johnson, “Pipelines vs. trains: Which is better for moving oil?,” CBC News (10
March 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/pipelines-vs-trains-which-is-better-formoving-oil-1.2988407> [perma.cc/KN7F-9X4H]; David Biello, “Are Pipelines Safer Than Railroads
for Carrying Oil?,” Scienti¿c American (10 July 2013), online: <https://blogs.scienti¿camerican.com/
observations/are-pipelines-safer-than-railroads-for-carrying-oil/> [perma.cc/AL75-TMLB]; David Z
Morris, “Pipelines: The Worst Way to Move Oil, Except for All the Rest,” Fortune (28 August 2016),
online: <http://fortune.com/2016/08/28/pipelines-vs-trains-oil-transport/> [perma.cc/8GP6-6CJL].
213. Globe, “Pain in the oil patch,” supra note 210.
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a “reasonable accounting of competing views in any controversy so as
to enable readers to make up their own minds.”214 Rather, the *OREH’s
coverage of Trans Mountain (and pipelines more generally) reÀects the
media propaganda model introduced earlier in this article. Instead of
providing a balanced and informed account of the costs and bene¿ts of
the project and its alternatives, the *OREH’s coverage of Trans Mountain
consists of a series of strategically misleading choices, emphases, and
omissions. Further consideration of the media propaganda model suggests
a broader, structural explanation of the *OREH’s misleading coverage of
Trans Mountain.
The *OREH is owned and controlled by a corporate conglomerate having
extensive non-media holdings and ¿nancial interests. The *OREH’s owner,
the Thomson family, has been described as the “archetype” of this form of
corporate empire, with holdings in real estate, oil and gas, insurance, and
¿nancial and management services.215 This type of ownership situation
increases the risk of media outlets being misused to support other parts of
the corporate group.216 For example, Thomson Reuters, the global media
and ¿nancial research services company controlled by the Thomson
family, includes a commodities trading service—EIKON—designed “for
deep analysis and to ¿nd growth opportunities in the power, gas, coal,
carbon, and oil commodity markets.”217 This business line also offers the
“ability to visualize the Àows, shipping, pipeline, and infrastructure across
the energy value chain.”218 This does not suggest, let alone establish, that
Thomson Reuters’ ¿nancial interests in the oil and gas sector are a direct
cause of the *OREH¶s editorial agenda. It is, however, relevant to the broader
organizational and ideological context in which the *OREH operates.
Similarly, the *OREH’s directors and senior managers remain, broadly
speaking, part of Canada’s “corporate elite.”219 Accordingly, one would
expect the *OREH to be broadly sympathetic to the corporate elite’s views of
the public interest.220 Notably, Canada’s corporate elite includes its major
¿nancial institutions. Five of Canada’s six largest banks, for example,
have signi¿cant ¿nancial exposure to the oil sands (i.e. BMO, CIBC,
Scotiabank, RBC, and TD Bank) as well as board members in common
214. *OREH, “Editorial Code of Conduct,” VXSUDnote 53.
215. Hackett, Pinet & Ruggles, “News for Whom?,” VXSUDnote 30 at 263.
216. ,ELG.
217. Thomson Reuters EIKON, online: <https://¿nancial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/toolsapplications/trading-investment-tools/eikon-trading-software/energy-trading.html> [perma.cc/T2QPJY5K].
218. ,ELG.
219. Wallace Clement, 7KH&DQDGLDQ&RUSRUDWH(OLWH(Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, 1975).
220. P Audley, &DQDGD¶V&XOWXUDO,QGXVWULHV(Toronto, ON: James Lorimer/CIEP, 1983) at 27.
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with oil sands companies.221 In 2017, the top ¿ve Canadian banks provided
US$33-billion in debt and equity ¿nancing to oil sands producers, lique¿ed
natural gas operations, and coal-¿red power producers.222 That ¿gure more
than doubled those banks’ level of investment in the oil sands in 2016.223
Some of those banks (e.g. BMO, CIBC, RBC, and Scotiabank) have
repeatedly warned about the economic risks of not approving the Trans
Mountain expansion project, and the *OREH has consistently reported those
warnings without disclosing those banks’ ¿nancial exposure to oil sands
projects or their interlocking directorships with oil sands companies.
The *OREH’s corporate ownership context helps explain—if not
excuse—the *OREH’s strategic use of misleading choices, emphases, and
omissions in its promotion of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion
as a project in Canada’s national public interest. The *OREH frames the
pipeline’s expansion as a responsible means of maintaining Canada’s
(non-renewable) resource-based economy while Canada transitions to a
low-carbon economy but omits to explain that no such transition is yet
underway, despite it being a matter of utmost urgency. Further, the *OREH
does not explain that the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion is itself a
means of H[SDQGLQJ production in Canada’s oil and gas sector, and that
such an expansion is directly at odds with hastening the transition towards
decarbonization. By portraying that transition as a longer-term project, the
*OREH materially misstates the climate-science-and-policy consensus that
decarbonization can, and PXVW, begin immediately.
Moreover, by consistently framing the Trans Mountain project
in terms of relative safety (as compared with rail transport), the *OREH
effectively omits a meaningful discussion of the project’s direct, upstream,
and downstream climate impacts. Even when the *OREH does discuss Trans
Mountain in connection with climate change, it does so by diminishing its
importance and, critically, its urgency.
Finally, in its coverage of the issue of constitutional jurisdiction over
pipeline approvals, the *OREH omits any discussion whatsoever of the
fact that jurisdiction over environmental protection in Canada is shared
221. See e.g. Hamish Stewart, “Why are directors at Canada’s biggest banks ignoring climate risk?,”
1DWLRQDO2EVHUYHU(19 April 2016), online: <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2016/04/19/opinion/
why-are-directors-canada%E2%80%99s-biggest-banks-ignoring-climate-risk>
[perma.cc/F3VVFQ8A]. See also Rainforest Action Network, “Banking on Climate Change: Fossil Fuel Finance
Report Card 2018” (2018), online: <https://www.ran.org/bankingonclimatechange2018/> [perma.
cc/7HFF-4KGE].
222. James Bradshaw & Shawn McCarthy, “TD vows to continue ¿nancing resource sector,” 7KH
*OREH DQG 0DLO (29 March 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-tdvows-to-continue-¿nancing-resource-sector/> [perma.cc/LK32-F663].
223. ,ELG
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between the federal government and the provinces. Instead, the *OREH
treats the Trans Mountain project as simply an interprovincial undertaking
under exclusive federal jurisdiction and ignores the fact that the adverse
environmental impacts of potential oil spills in British Columbia triggers
the shared, cooperative jurisdiction of the federal government and British
Columbia. The *OREH has even gone as far as impugning British Columbia’s
proposal for further scienti¿c study of how spilled diluted bitumen
behaves in marine environments, asserting that “the buoyancy of dilbit
has already been subject to years of research” without also acknowledging
that such research, including a comprehensive study conducted by the
Royal Society of Canada, clearly explains that there are serious gaps in
our understanding of the behaviour and effects of diluted bitumen spilled
in cold-water environments.224
The *OREH’s editorial coverage of the jurisdictional dispute in respect of
Trans Mountain is also notably inconsistent with its coverage of the federal
government’s carbon pricing framework. While the issue of jurisdiction
over Trans Mountain is better understood as falling within the cooperative,
federal-provincial jurisdiction over environmental protection, there is
little question that the federal government possesses ample and exclusive
jurisdiction to impose a national price on carbon, whether pursuant to its
criminal law power, its taxation power, or its residual jurisdiction under
the national concern branch of its peace, order, and good government
(POGG) power.225 Yet in response to a number of provinces’ decision to
oppose a national carbon price and formally challenge its constitutional
224. Canadian Press, “Oil spills’ environmental impact: Knowledge gaps cited in new report,”
&%& 1HZV (25 November 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.3336221> [perma.cc/W4GANESX]. See also Stephanie J Green HWDO, “Oil sands and the marine environment: current knowledge
and future challenges” (2017) 15:2 Front Ecol Environ 74. Remarkably, however, the *OREH later
published a news report on a research project in the Experimental Lakes Area addressing the “dearth
of information on how to deal with oil-related accidents,” noting that “[e]xperts say the need for
such studies is acute”: Ivan Semeniuk, “Slick science: How researchers are preparing for Canada’s
next major oil spill,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (30 July 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/canada/article-slick-science-how-researchers-are-preparing-for-canadas-next-major/> [perma.
cc/K55R-BNHH] A telling feature of the *OREH’s editorial coverage of the Trans Mountain project is
its refusal to engage with the scienti¿c and other expert evidence concerning the adverse effects of the
project.
225. See Nathalie Chalifour, “Saskatchewan, Ontario and the constitutionality of a national carbon
price,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (27 September 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/article-saskatchewan-ontario-and-the-constitutionality-of-a-national-carbon/>
[perma.cc/
MDF3-X9QA]. See also Nathalie J Chalifour, “Canadian Climate Federalism: Parliament’s Ample
Constitutional Authority to Legislate GHG Emissions through Regulations, A National Cap and Trade
Program, or a National Carbon Tax” (2016) 33 NJCL 331; Jason MacLean, “Alberta’s support of the
national climate plan is nice, but hardly necessary,” 0DFOHDQ¶V(24 February 2018), online: <https://
www.macleans.ca/news/canada/albertas-support-of-the-national-climate-plan-is-nice-but-hardlynecessary/> [perma.cc/6GKA-MCPE].
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YDOLGLW\ WKH *OREH KDV UHIUDLQHG IURP DUJXLQJ LQ IDYRXU RI WKH IHGHUDO
JRYHUQPHQW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ OHW DORQH FKDVWLVLQJ WKRVH SURYLQFHV²DV WKH
*OREH FKDVWLVHG %ULWLVK &ROXPELD²IRU XVXUSLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GXO\
H[HUFLVHGDXWKRULW\,QVWHDGWKH*OREHDUJXHGWKDWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW
QHHGVVWHSXSLWVHIIRUWV³WRVHOOFDUERQSULFLQJ´7KH*OREH¶VDQDO\VLV
RPLWWHGDQ\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VH[FOXVLYHMXULVGLFWLRQWRSULFH
FDUERQ QDWLRQDOO\ DQG IUDPHG WKH LVVXH DV EHLQJ H[FOXVLYHO\ SROLWLFDO
UDWKHUWKDQOHJDOLQQDWXUH7KHFRQWUDVWWRWKH*OREH¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRI
WKHPXFKPRUHFRPSOH[MXULVGLFWLRQDOLVVXHLQUHVSHFWRI7UDQV0RXQWDLQ
LVVWDUNDQGWHOOLQJ
2YHUDOO WKH *OREH¶V HGLWRULDO FRYHUDJH RI 7UDQV 0RXQWDLQ LV
V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ PLVOHDGLQJ ,W DPRXQWV WR DQ DEGLFDWLRQ RI LWV VHOI
SURFODLPHGSXEOLFLQWHUHVWUROHDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGLVEHWWHUFKDUDFWHUL]HG
DVPHGLDSURSDJDQGDWKDQLQGHSHQGHQWMRXUQDOLVP1RWRQO\GRHVLWRIIHU
EXW D SDUWLDO²DQG KLJKO\ SDUWLVDQ²SHUVSHFWLYH RQ WKH SURMHFW DQG LWV
LPSOLFDWLRQV LW VHUYHV WR QDUURZ WKH SDUDPHWHUV RI WKH SURMHFW¶V SXEOLF
GLVFXVVLRQLQDPDQQHUWKDWGLUHFWO\VXSSRUWVWKHVSHFLDOLQWHUHVWVRIWKHRLO
DQGJDVLQGXVWU\
:KLOH WKH *OREH¶V HGLWRULDO FRPPHQWDU\ DV ZHOO DV WKDW RI LWV VWDII
FROXPQLVWV RQ 7UDQV 0RXQWDLQ LV XQLIRUPO\ RQHVLGHG DQG PLVOHDGLQJ
WKH *OREH GRHV RFFDVLRQDOO\ SXEOLVK LQGHSHQGHQW RSLQLRQHGLWRULDOV
H[SUHVVLQJYLHZSRLQWVRXWVLGHWKHQDUURZWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFHHVWDEOLVKHG
E\WKH*OREH¶VFRYHUDJHPDQ\RIZKLFKKDYHEHHQFLWHGWKURXJKRXWWKLV
DUWLFOH %XW WKLV WRR LV HQWLUHO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH PHGLD SURSDJDQGD
PRGHO RI +HUPDQ DQG &KRPVN\ %\ DOORZLQJ GLVVHQWLQJ YLHZV WKRXJK
OLPLWHGLQIUHTXHQF\WKH*OREHFUHDWHVWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWOLYHO\GLVVHQW
LV SRVVLEOH DQG LQGHHG RFFXUULQJ WKHUHE\ SUHHPSWLQJ HDV\ DFFXVDWLRQV
RI ELDV :KDW LV HVSHFLDOO\ UHYHDOLQJ LV KRZ WKH *OREH¶V HGLWRULDO SDJH
UHIXVHVWRMRLQLVVXHZLWKWKRVHLQGHSHQGHQWGLVVHQWLQJYLHZVRQWKH7UDQV
0RXQWDLQSURMHFWWKDWLWKDVSXEOLVKHG1RZLWPD\ZHOOEHWKDWWKH*OREH
VLPSO\ ¿QGV WKRVH YLHZV XQFRQYLQFLQJ DQG LW LV UHDVRQDEOH WR DVVXPH
WKDW PDQ\ UHDGHUV KDYH UHDFKHG SUHFLVHO\ WKLV FRQFOXVLRQ QDPHO\ WKDW
WKRVHYLHZVDUHQRWHYHQZRUWKGLVFXVVLQJ,IKRZHYHUWKRVHYLHZVZHUH
¿WWRSULQWLQ&DQDGD¶VOHDGLQJQHZVSDSHULQWKH¿UVWSODFHWKHQWKH\DUH
DOVRSUHVXPDEO\FUHGLEOHHQRXJKWRPHULWFRQVLGHUDWLRQDQGDUHVSRQVH
LQGHHGPDQ\RIWKHPDUHZULWWHQE\DFDGHPLFVZKRDUHH[SHUWVLQWKHLU
UHVSHFWLYH ¿HOGV RI VWXG\ DQG LQ RWKHU LQVWDQFHV VXFK DV WKH OHWWHUV WR
WKH HGLWRU TXRWHG DERYH WKH DUJXPHQWV DUH FRPSHOOLQJ ,Q UHVSHFW RI

 *OREH³/LEHUDOVQHHGWRVHOOFDUERQSULFLQJ´VXSUDQRWH
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Trans Mountain, the *OREH¶s practice is simply to ignore—and thereby
marginalize—these dissenting views. The *OREH¶s coverage of the
Trans Mountain controversy is simply impossible to reconcile with its
self-congratulatory claim that ³H[SODLQLQJ SROLFLHV WKDW ZLOO GHFLGH RXU
HQYLURQPHQWDOIXWXUH>LV@FHQWUDOWRRXUUROH´227
On the contrary, the *OREH¶s coverage contributes to the legitimization
of policy and regulatory LQDFWLRQ on climate change, the larger context
in which the *OREH¶s coverage of Trans Mountain should have been
presented. Here the connection between media propaganda and regulatory
capture comes into clear view. The Canadian oil and gas industry is
opposed to supply-side climate mitigation measures, and is lobbying, not
only against any supply-side production curtailments, but in favour of
publicly subsidized supply-side expansion.
On 1 August 2019, the lead executives of three Canadian oil sands
companies took what the *OREH¶s editorial board characterized (without
further explanation) as “the newsworthy step” of placing a full-page
advertisement in newspapers (including the *OREH) “asking Canadians
to keep the health of the HQHUJ\LQGXVWU\ in mind when they vote in the
federal election in October.”228
Notice ¿rst the oil and gas industry and the *OREH¶s subtle use of
the synecdoche “energy industry,” which has the rhetorical effect of
identifying the whole of the energy industry with only its nonrenewable
part, the oil and gas sector, neatly eliding Canada’s renewable energy
sector. Far less subtle, however, is the *OREH’s identi¿cation of the oil and
gas industry’s special interests with the broader public interest, the VLQH
TXDQRQ of regulatory capture:
What everyone should want—IURP RLO H[HFXWLYHV WR SHRSOH LQ RWKHU
SURYLQFHV—is higher prices for exported Canadian oil. That puts money
in everyone’s pockets, ZLWKRXWQHFHVVDULO\LQFUHDVLQJHPLVVLRQV.
The one and only way to achieve that is for Alberta producers to get
their crude to tidewater, or across the border. That means pipelines, in
particular the Trans Mountain expansion that the Trudeau government is
trying to stickhandle into existence.
A vibrant oil industry is a good thing for Canada.229

The *OREH immediately added that “[e]fforts to cut emissions, through
carbon taxes, regulations and new technologies, are also necessary—for

227. *OREH“Globe wins B.C. awards,” VXSUDnote 56 [emphasis added].
228. *OREH, “Canada needs higher crude prices,” VXSUDnote 188 [emphasis added].
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Canada and the world.”230 But QRW, in the *OREH¶s strategic, propagandistic
omission, by means of curtailing oil and gas production or ceasing
construction of new oil and gas infrastructure, notwithstanding the fact
that, according to Environment and Climate Change Canada, in 2017 “the
oil and gas sector was the largest source of GHG emissions [in Canada],
accounting for 27% of total national emissions.”231
It is dif¿cult to conceive of a clearer example of how media propaganda
contributes to regulatory capture and, in this instance, legitimizes climate
policy inaction.
This raises questions about whether and how to improve media
news coverage of and editorial commentary on law and policy matters
implicating the public interest, climate change foremost among them. In
the next section of the article, I canvass the challenges of achieving this
sort of regulatory reform in the public interest, including reform of the
news media as both a means and an end of regulatory reform.
III. 3URSDJDQGDIDNHQHZVDQGWKHFDWFKRI¿[LQJWKHIRXUWKHVWDWH
News media propaganda of the kind discussed in this article suggests the
need for some kind of structural regulatory reform; if the *OREH¶s coverage
of the Trans Mountain controversy is at all representative, media selfregulation is plainly insuf¿cient. Direct government regulation of the news
media, however, is a doubly-dif¿cult prospect. First, and most obviously,
there is the constitutional protection of freedom of the press. But even
if laws and regulations could be carefully tailored to pass constitutional
muster (certainly not impossible, press freedom is not absolute), the
enforcement of any such regulations would have to maintain—and be
perceived to maintain—impartiality, free of either political or corporate
interference. The failure to meet this standard would be an ironic result
if the goal were to enhance the editorial independence of the news media
from the government of the day and the corporate interests inÀuencing
both media coverage and government regulations.
Moreover, any such attempt at regulatory reform would necessarily
confront the catch-22 of countering regulatory capture: The very same
special interests responsible for media propaganda bene¿t from such
propaganda, and are well positioned to use their inÀuence to shield the
media—and their own interests—from proposed public interest regulatory
reforms.232 This catch-22 is even more pronounced in the context of
230. ,ELG.
231. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Greenhouse gas emissions,” VXSUDnote 161 at 8.
232. For further discussion of the “catch-22” of reforming regulatory capture, see MacLean,
“Regulatory Capture and the Role of Academics,” VXSUDnote 3 at 514-522.
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proposed media reforms because the news media themselves are ideally
positioned to publicly protect their own freedoms by invoking the very
principles of journalistic integrity and independence—the “marketplace of
ideas”—that they arguably honour more in the breach than in observance.
Perhaps ironically, concerns about the anti-democratic effects of “fake
news” as distinct from but related to mainstream media propaganda are
drawing more scholarly and regulatory attention to the form and substance
of the emerging news and information ecosystem of the 21st century.233
This is ironic insofar as one of the key concerns about fake news is its
potential to devalue and delegitimize established voices of expertise
and authoritative institutions, including the corporate mainstream news
media.234 While fake news is de¿ned as fabricated information that mimics
mainstream news media content but which is produced by outlets lacking
the mainstream news media’s established editorial norms and processes
for ensuring objectivity, scholars also argue that fake news “overlaps with
other information disorders, such as misinformation (false or misleading
information) and disinformation (false information that is purposely spread
to deceive people).”235 Scholarly and regulatory analyses of fake news,
as understood in this broader sense of information disorder, may bring
additional needed attention to the erosion of the established corporate
news media’s editorial norms and processes for ensuring objectivity.
Fake news and mainstream media propaganda are strikingly similar
phenomena raising conceptually similar concerns. After all, from the
perspective of the misinformed and misled reader, there is no apparent
difference between these kinds of information: both are presented as
factual, objective, and capable and deserving of belief. In short, both
appear—or at least attempt to appear—to be true. Consequently, one
of the key cognitive mechanisms responsible for the “believability” of
fake news, familiarity through repeated exposure, may also inÀuence
the “believability” of mainstream news media propaganda.236 This
experimental ¿nding in respect of fake news holds true even in cases of
highly implausible and partisan claims: Both become more believable
with repetition.237 Such ¿ndings may have implications beyond fake news
on social media: “they suggest that politicians who continuously repeat

233. Lazer HWDO, “Science of fake news,” VXSUDnote 14 at 1096.
234. Information Society Project, “Fighting Fake News,” VXSUDnote 15 at 3.
235. Lazer HWDO, “Science of fake news,” VXSUDnote 14 at 1094.
236. See Gordon Pennycook, Tyrone D Cannon & David G Rand, “Prior exposure increases perceived
accuracy of fake news” (2018) Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, online: <https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958246>.
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false statements will be successful, at least to some extent, in convincing
people those statements are in fact true.”238 This, in turn, suggests that a
leading newspaper that repeatedly claims that an oil pipeline project is
in the national public interest will be successful, to some extent, perhaps
to a signi¿cant extent, in convincing its readers that its repeated claim is
true. This similarly suggests that a claim as ostensibly implausible and
partisan—Orwellian, even—as the *OREH¶s claim that approving the Trans
Mountain oil pipeline expansion is critical to Canada’s efforts to reduce
its greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change will prove
convincing, if repeated often enough.239
The research and regulatory reform agendas arising out of both
mainstream news media propaganda and social media fake news are
daunting, requiring nothing less than the creation of an information
ecosystem that values and promotes the pursuit and veri¿cation of the
truth.240 Direct government regulation generally raises concerns—some
legitimate, some simply seeking to avoid regulation altogether—about free
enterprise, free markets, and human agency. The concentrated ownership of
20th-century news media companies signi¿cantly shaped the information
available to individuals to consider as citizens and consumers, and those
institutions still signi¿cantly inÀuence individuals’ understandings of
important policy issues. However, those institutions—imperfect as they
are—are now under threat by much larger Internet oligopolies that are
shaping people’s experience and understanding of the world on a global
scale.241 Not only is it incumbent on law and policy scholars to think about
how to hold these massive new corporate entities to account, but scholars
across disciplines must also collaborate on efforts to reduce the spread of
propaganda and fake news and, most importantly, address the underlying
political and regulatory fault lines that propaganda and fake news have
exposed.
&RQFOXVLRQ
As an examination of the discursive construction of the public interest
in respect of a controversial oil pipeline project via a close reading of
the editorial coverage of a leading national newspaper, the ¿ndings of
this article are necessarily limited. A more comprehensive account would
also have examined television news coverage of the project, although in

238.
239.
240.
241.

,ELG
Jaccard, “Trudeau’s Orwellian logic,” VXSUDnote 174.
Lazer HWDO, “Science of fake news,” VXSUDnote 14 at 1096.
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Canada, mainstream newspaper coverage has tended to set the agenda for
television news coverage.242
Another limitation is the omission of commentary on social media
about the Trans Mountain pipeline and its climate change implications.
While the *OREH’s and other Canadian newspapers’ coverage is also
shared via social media, directly examining social media representations
and campaigns would doubtless reveal additional dimensions of the public
perception of the relationship between oil sands development and climate
change.243
Perhaps the most serious limitation is this article’s lack of ready
regulatory reform proposals, be they at the level of Canada’s news media
(including the *OREH and its failure to live up to its own Editorial Code of
Conduct), at the level of Canada’s stalled and unambitious climate change
policy and regulatory framework, or at the global level of the spread of false
and misleading information and its adverse effects on democracy. While
a checklist of potentially-useful measures, such as the recommendations
provided by the Council of Europe’s report on “Information Disorder,”244
should not be discounted, absent an analysis of how such reform proposals
can address both the speci¿c substantive problem of mainstream media
propaganda as well as the broader structural dif¿culties of reforming
media institutions, such measures are mere aspirations. There are no ready
solutions to these dif¿culties. Nothing short of an ambitious, integrated,
and interdisciplinary action-research agenda will suf¿ce.
In the meantime, however, in addition to amplifying calls to promote
interdisciplinary research on how reduce the spread of false and misleading
information, there are two additional avenues that law and policy scholars
can immediately pursue.245 The ¿rst is to defend and exercise academic
freedom in order to assist and collaborate with those independent media
and information outlets that remain committed to seeking and expressing
242. Hackett, Pinet & Ruggles, “News for Whom?,” VXSUD note 30 at 261. Anecdotally, I can report
that this appears to remain the case. Like many Canadian academics I suspect, I am a compulsive
viewer of CBC’s news programme “Power and Politics.” The topics covered and discussed on “Power
and Politics” tend to track quite closely topics covered ¿rst by the *OREH.
243. For an exploration of these other sources, including the social media campaigns of the Canadian
oil and gas industry, see e.g. Jason MacLean, “Paris DQG Pipelines? Canada’s Climate Policy Puzzle”
(2018) 32:1 J Envtl L & Prac 47 at 55-56. See also Maria Bakardjieva, Mylym Felt & Rhon Teruelle,
“Framing the Pipeline Problem: Civic Claimsmakers and Social Media” (2018) 43:1 Canadian Journal
of Communication 147.
244. Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, “Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary
framework for research and policymaking” (Council of Europe, 2017) at 80-84, online: <https://edoc.
coe.int/en/media/7495-information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researchand-policy-making.html> [perma.cc/ZH2K-ZBFM].
245. Lazer HWDO, “Science of fake news,” VXSUDnote 14 at 1096.
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the truth in news.246 A timely case in point is the climate change reporting
of The Guardian, whose statement of editorial independence is quoted
at the outset of this article. As I wrote the ¿rst draft of this concluding
section, The Guardian reported that a special report of the IPCC (discussed
above) indicated that “urgent and unprecedented changes” are required
in order to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above the preindustrial norm.247 Relying on commentary from academics involved in
climate science and policy research, The Guardian not only conveyed the
¿ndings of the IPCC’s report, but it also presented the critically important
argument that the report was, rather than being truly alarming, in fact
“incredibly conservative” because of its failure to discuss either the likely
rise in climate-driven refugees or the danger of irreversible climate tipping
points and a resulting “hothouse Earth” scenario.248
The Guardian’s climate reporting proceeded to relate how the
IPCC’s report may actually underestimate the scale of the challenge of
decarbonization, noting how a number of countries nominally supportive
of the Paris Climate Agreement are “involved in fossil fuel extraction that
runs against the spirit of their [emissions-reduction] commitments. Britain
is pushing ahead with gas fracking, Norway with oil exploration in the
Arctic, and the German government wants to tear down Hambach forest
to dig for coal.”249 Similarly independent and critical reporting is being
done in Canada by The Narwhal and The National Observer,250 and both
are open to collaborations with law and policy scholars.
The second avenue is to undertake more “engaged scholarship” and,
in so doing, directly counter media propaganda and other misleading
information in scholars’ respective areas of academic expertise. The
political scientist Jessica Green argues that the time has come to rethink the
relationship between the academy and advocacy.251 Research that seeks to
246. Brian Leiter, “Why Academic Freedom” in Donald A Downs & Chris W Suprenant, eds, The
Value and Limits of Academic Speech: Philosophical, Political, and Legal Perspectives (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2018).
247. Jonathan Watts, “Huge risk if global warming passes 1.5° C, warns landmark UN report,” The
Guardian (8 October 2018), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/globalwarming-must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report> [perma.cc/UHT2-Y24C].
248. Ibid. See also The Guardian’s critical commentary aided by academic research on the IPCC’s
more recent special report on the relationship between land use and climate change: George Monbiot,
“We can’t keep eating as we are —why isn’t the IPCC shouting this from the rooftops?,” The Guardian
(8 August 2019), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/08/ipcc-landclimate-report-carbon-cost-meat-dairy> [perma.cc/REQ8-5DJ8].
249. Ibid.
250. The Narwhal: http://thenarwhal.ca/ [perma.cc/652H-WWY3]; The National Observer: https://
www.nationalobserver.com/ [perma.cc/8UVG-8K5Y].
251. Jessica F Green, “Why We Need a More Activist Academy,” The Chronicle of Higher Education
(15 July 2018), online: <https://www.chronicle.com/article/Why-We-Need-a-More-Activist/243924>
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connect theoretical insights to public policy problems must become more
prevalent. Responding in particular to the existential threat of climate
change, Green argues, requires that academics with relevant expertise “lay
bare the entrenched economic interests that prevent governments from
phasing out fossil fuels.”252 The analysis undertaken in this article is a
modest attempt to do just that.

[perma.cc/3XUD-A6AK].
252. ,ELG Green’s call echoes the call to academics originally issued in 1967 by Noam Chomsky
to speak the truth and expose lies. See Noam Chomsky, 7KH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ RI ,QWHOOHFWXDOV (New
York, NY: The New Press, 2017) at 17. See also John P Smol, “A crisis in science literacy and
communication: Does Reluctance to engage the public make academic scientists complicit?” (2018) 3
FACETS 952.

